Artificial Myth vs. Reality
The claim of "Russia's insurmountable military superiority" is an artificial myth created to demoralize Ukrainians and Western audiences. It relies on false premises: that the Russian army is all-powerful and Ukraine is doomed. In reality, the Ukrainian Armed Forces demonstrate high professionalism, adaptability, and strategic flexibility, while Kremlin propaganda ignores facts to create an illusion of invincibility.
The Myth Uses Psychological and Linguistic Traps
The propaganda thesis employs several techniques:
- Emotional substitution for logic: constant repetition of "Ukraine cannot" creates learned helplessness, fostering a sense of inevitability.
- False dilemma: "Russia wins — Ukraine is doomed," although the outcome depends on multiple factors: strategy, external support, and the morale of the army and population.
- Concept substitution: "military superiority" is presented as a monolithic measure of numbers or equipment, ignoring experience, training, efficiency, and troop morale.
These techniques are reinforced via TV, bots, Telegram channels, and social media, creating the illusion of Ukraine's inevitable defeat.
Facts Against the Myth: Ukraine Can Defend and Counterattack
1. Military experience and adaptability
Ukrainian forces have proven capable of effective defense and counteroffensive operations, including major successful operations in the Kharkiv direction (2022) and liberating southern Ukraine. Combat experience shows high mobility, skilled use of drones, air defense, and Western weaponry.
2. Support from international allies
The US, EU countries, and NATO provide Kyiv with modern weapons, intelligence, and training, offsetting Russia's numerical advantage.
3. Economic and moral resilience
Ukraine maintains functioning government institutions, logistics, industry, and civilian support for the military, making "instant defeat" scenarios impossible.
Internal Contradictions of the Myth
- The fiction of Russia's total invincibility contradicts real losses: high personnel and equipment losses, unit demoralization, and mass desertions (IISS Military Balance 2023–2025).
- Ignoring Ukraine's adaptability is a critical weakness of propaganda. Focusing on Russian numbers and Soviet-era equipment hides real battlefield dynamics.
- Manipulation of figures and information: Ukrainian losses are exaggerated, Russian losses minimized, creating the illusion of superiority.
Purpose and Consequences of the Myth
The propaganda thesis serves to:
- demoralize the Ukrainian population, fostering self-doubt;
- discredit Western support by portraying Ukraine as "unneeded" or "doomed";
- legitimize Russian aggression and justify ongoing war.
In societies where the myth is widely spread, it creates a "cannot-win" effect, leading to fear, passivity, and submission.
Alternative: Truth and Facts
The real picture is based on objective data:
- Ukraine conducts successful defense, retaining initiative in key regions;
- international support compensates for technological and numerical advantages of the enemy;
- morale, adaptability, and innovation are decisive factors absent in Russian propaganda.
Each point is confirmed by independent sources and OSINT research, OSCE, and NATO analytical center reports.
Conclusion
The thesis "Ukraine cannot win" is a propaganda tool, not an objective assessment. Ukraine demonstrates the ability to defend, strike back, adapt, and leverage international support. Reality on the front fully refutes the myth of Russian invincibility and shows that the outcome depends on strategy, preparation, and morale.
Legal and International Context
The myth is used to justify aggression that violates international law:
- Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter prohibit aggression against sovereign states.
- 1949 Geneva Conventions (ICRC, Geneva Conventions) prohibit attacks on civilians and civilian objects.
- Numerous OSCE and Human Rights Watch reports document Russian violations of war rules, including attacks on residential areas, schools, and medical facilities (OSCE Ukraine Reports).
The propaganda thesis attempts to conceal these violations, creating an illusion of Russia's moral right to military action.
Examples of Successful Ukrainian Defense and Counterattacks
- Kharkiv counteroffensive (September 2022) — reclaiming over 3,000 sq. km of territory (NATO Briefing).
- Operations in southern Ukraine — holding key ports and strategic communications (IISS Military Balance 2023–2025).
- Use of drones, anti-tank systems, and Western weapons — effective despite numerical superiority of the enemy.
- High morale and mass mobilization of citizens, volunteers, and reservists.
Main Sources and References
- OSCE — situation monitoring and combat reports
- NATO — assessments of Ukraine's operational capabilities
- IISS Military Balance 2023–2025 — force and loss analysis
- OSINT studies by InformNapalm — real front-line photos and data
- Human Rights Watch — documentation of Russian international law violations
- EUvsDisinfo — examples of propaganda myths
About the Authors
This article was curated and verified by a team of experts in international law, human rights, and geopolitical analysis. Contributors have 15+ years of experience in research, legal documentation, and educational content development.
Methodology
The content on this site is compiled and verified by experts in international law, human rights, and geopolitical research. Sources include official legal documents, national and international legislation, resolutions of the UN, reports from international organizations, and verified open-source evidence. Each claim is cross-checked against multiple primary and secondary sources, ensuring accuracy, neutrality, and reliability regardless of the topic—whether analyzing violations of Russian law, Ukrainian law, or international legal norms.
Expert Statement
The authors affirm that the information presented reflects established legal interpretations and documented facts. Analyses are grounded in international law principles and widely recognized geopolitical assessments. References to official documents and reports are provided to ensure transparency and trustworthiness.
Last modified date: 25/11/2025


