V. Alleged Violations and Abuses of International Human Rights Law

a. Impact of the Conflict on Civil and Political Rights

The first mission concluded that the conflict in Ukraine had had a major impact on the enjoyment of civil and political rights, including some of non-derogable rights, such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The evidence collected by the second mission confirms this conclusion. In the period under scrutiny in this report (1 April - 25 June 2022), extensive violations of civil and political rights, such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial or the right to freedom of expression, were committed. Most of these violations are, again, attributed to the Russian Federation and they predominantly, albeit not exclusively, occurred in the territories under the temporary occupation of the Russian Federation. There is again an overlap between violations of IHRL (International Human Rights Law) and those of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), which is why the same incidents are sometimes referred to in the two sections. Moreover, the most serious of these violations may constitute crimes against humanity and/or war crimes.

Although this report focuses primarily on the period indicated above, the violations committed prior to 1 April 2022 but which were not reported in the first report, because information about them only became available after this date, are also included in this second report. The focus again lies on the civil and political rights most severely or extensively affected by the conflict. The mission however wants to stress that there is hardly any civil and political right which would be wholly unaffected by the current conflict. As explained in the first report, civil and political rights can be violated both by action (negative obligations, obligation to respect) and by inaction (positive obligations, obligations to protect and fulfil). The latter type of violations is more difficult to identify and, in some cases, the identification is only possible after some time (e.g., the failure to investigate); this report therefore, again identically as the first report, mainly concentrates on the former type of violations.

1. Right to Life

In the period under scrutiny in this report, no derogation from the right to life “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war” under Article 15(2) of the ECHR was made by either Ukraine or the Russian Federation. The provisions relating to this right (Article 2 of the ECHR, as well as Article 6 of the ICCPR for which no derogation is possible) remain fully in force, though they must be interpreted considering the applicable rules of IHL.

The second mission wishes to echo the serious concerns expressed by the first mission about the large number of persons, both civilians and military personnel, who have been killed during the conflict. By 17 June 2022, according to the data of the UN High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), the number of civilian casualties reached 10,094 persons (4,509 killed and 5,585 wounded). Out of this number, most casualties occurred in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (5,745 casualties - 2,628 killed and 3,117 injured), mainly on government-controlled territories (4,845 casualties - 2,452 killed and 2,393 injured). 315 Among those killed, there were 1,769 men, 1,182 women, 126 girls and 137 boys, as well as 41 children and 1,314 adults whose sex is yet unknown. The OHCHR indicates that the actual figures are most likely higher, as it only reports those instances of killings and injuries that it has been able to verify. Ukraine itself reports more than 25,000 killed civilians, most of whom were killed during the siege of the city of Mariupol. 316 The killed civilians are in the majority Ukrainian citizens, though over 30 foreign citizens from several countries of the world have also been reported killed.

The number of military casualties is at this stage difficult to determine with any precision. The two parties to the conflict both tend to underrate their own casualties while overrating those of the enemy. Already in the late March 2022, Oleksiy Arestovych, advisor to the office of the president of Ukraine, announced that Ukraine would not disclose any exact numbers of its military casualties. Since such numbers could help Russia assess the efficiency of its actions, these numbers need to be considered as a military secret. 317 In late May 2022, however, President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine was losing 60-100 soldiers per day. 318 Other Ukrainian sources indicate an even higher figure (200-500 killed per day). 319 Overall, the estimates of the military casualties (killed) on the Ukrainian side range from 10,000 (Ukraine - by 11 June 2022) 320 to 23,000 (Russia - by 16 April 2022). 321 This includes some 30 foreign citizens who had joined the Ukrainian Foreign Legion.

Concerning the Russian side, the Russian Federation also does not disclose the exact number of its casualties. On 7 April 2022, the speaker of the president, Dmitry Peskov indicated that Russia had suffered significant losses during the war, 322 without however specifying what these losses were. On 1 June 2022, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defence, Andrei Kartapolov stated that as a result of a change in the approach to warfare, the Russian army has practically stopped losing people, which should explained why no information about military casualties had been made public since late March. 323 Ukraine on the contrary estimates that by mid-June 2022, Russia had lost more than 33,000 soldiers in the conflict. 324 That again includes some foreign citizens who had joined the Russian side or the units of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.

Due to the considerable number of both civilian and military death, the mission was not in the position to verify the circumstances of all deaths and injuries and to assess their legality. It may be assumed that many of the casualties, especially among military personnel, are lawful under IHL and could be lawful under IHRL as well.

The mission however recalls that, as the ECHR stated in Ahmed Ozkan v. Turkey (2004), the right to life, as enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR, “covers not only intentional killing but also the situations where it is permitted to “use force” which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life /.../. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims”. 325 Furthermore, in the assessment, it is necessary to take into account “not only the actions of State agents who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination /.../. The responsibility of the State is not confined to circumstances where there is significant evidence that misdirected fire from State agents has killed a civilian. It may also be engaged where they fail to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to avoiding and, in any event, to minimising incidental loss of civilian life”. 326

The obligation to take precautionary measures in the planning of security or military operations to minimize incidental losses of life is preventative (ex ante) in nature. It is coupled with the subsequent (ex post) obligation to carry out “some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios,  agents of the State”. 327 Although the form of the investigation may vary depending on the circumstances, 328 the investigation “must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible”. 329 330

Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation thus have the obligation to seek to prevent or minimize incidental losses of life in the military operations carried by their armed forces and to investigate instances of death, especially civilian death, that occur during such operations in the areas under their control. The second mission also takes note of the position expressed by the UN Human Rights Committee that “States parties engaged in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation of life, violate ipso facto article 6 of the Covenant”. 336

In addition to the deprivation of life stemming, deliberately or incidentally, from military operations, the second mission has documented a rather large number of instances of targeted, extrajudicial killings of civilian persons and persons deprived of liberty, both prisoners of war and civilian detainees. The second mission recalls that extrajudicial killings by State agents, including the members of the military forces, constitute a violation of the right to life. Moreover, States have the obligation to take all reasonable measures to protect individuals against serious threats to their life by non-state actors and to investigate any instance of the killing carried out by such actors. 331 Extrajudicial killing is a deliberate and targeted killing of a person without the lawful authority granted by a judicial proceedings which is arbitrary (Article 6 of the ICCPR) or which is not absolutely necessary to achieve one of the recognized legal grounds (Article 2 of the ECHR). Acts of extrajudicial killings may also amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity (Articles 1(1)(a) and 8(2)(a)(i) of the Rome Statute of the ICC).

During its visit to Ukraine, the mission had the opportunity to visit the towns of Bucha, Irpin and Hostomel, in the vicinity of Kyiv. In late February and early March 2022, heavy fighting was taking place in the area and by 5-12 March, the three towns all became under the control of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. They were recaptured by the Ukrainian armed forces on 28 March-1 April 2022. After the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, reports, photos, and videos of some 20 dead persons in civilian clothing left lying in one street of Bucha started circulating in the media. 332 One person had his hands tied behind his back with a white cloth and had his Ukrainian passport left next to his body. On 4 April 2022, the bodies of five men with their hands tied were found in the basement of a children’s health centre in Bucha. 333 Moreover, a mass grave containing more than 70 bodies was found close to the church in the centre of Bucha. Some bodies showed obvious signs of torture and mutilation. On 16 May 2022, BBC News reported that more than 1,000 civilians had been killed in Bucha and the surrounding region during the Russian occupation, out of whom more than 650 had been shot dead by the Russian armed forces. 334 The Ukrainian estimates are even higher.

The Russian Federation denies any allegations of targeted killings of civilians arguing first that “not a single local resident had suffered from any violent action” while under the control of the Russian armed forces and that the reports of extrajudicial killings were “a hoax, a staged production and provocation by the Kiev regime for the Western media”. 335 Later on, it indicated that “many civilians in Bucha had died not from gunshot wounds, as Ukraine claimed, but from artillery shells of the obsolete type, which were used by the Ukrainian army”. 336 Yet, already on 7 April 2022, the mayor of Bucha, Anatoly Fedoruk, indicated that almost 90% of the dead had died of bullet wounds, not shrapnel wounds, thus suggesting that they had most probably not been killed incidentally, as a collateral damage during the active hostilities but, rather, had been deliberately targeted. 337

This conclusion has been corroborated by a detailed report on the events in Bucha issued by Human Rights Watch on 21 April 2022. 338 According to this report, shortly after the occupation of the town by the Russian armed forces in early March 2022, Russian soldiers made a search of residential buildings, going from one door to another and claiming to be hunting Nazis. They interrogated local residents, forced some of them to leave their flats and move to shelters and detained a certain number of local male inhabitants. The bodies of some of these detained civilians were among those found lying in the street, in yards or in basements. In at least two cases, victim-activated booby traps were placed on the dead bodies. Human Rights Watch was able to establish specific facts relating to some of the extrajudicial killings, for instance those of Oleh Abramov and Vasily Nedashkivskyi, who were detained by the Russian armed forces in their homes and later found dead, or of Serhiy Mateshko, Dmytro Shulmeister, Volodymyr Boychenko, Valery Prudko and Viktor Prudko, the five men whose bodies were found in the basement of a children’s health centre in Bucha.

There are also documented cases of indiscriminate shooting by the Russian armed forces of any persons venturing outside their homes during the period of the occupation. Thus, on 7 March 2022, Vasyl Yushenko from Bucha was shot in his neck when he went to smoke a cigarette in the enclosed balcony of his apartment. Three days earlier, a man whose identity has not been revealed was shot dead while trying to run away from the Russian forces. A 9-year old girl who was shot together with him survived but had her arm amputated. Civilians were also killed while trying to abandon the area in their car. For instance, during the evacuation from the town of Irpin on 6 March 2022, 8 civilians, including 2 children, were killed by Russian mortar units shelling the route. 339 There are reports that Ukrainian artillery position was located nearby. If these reports are correct, the deaths could in fact pass for incidental losses stemming from military operations and, as such, would not necessarily constitute a violation of the right to life, on the condition the Russian Federation took all precautionary measures to minimize these losses and the losses were not clearly disproportionate to the expected military gain. In most of the other incidents reported above, however, it would be hard to find any plausible legal justification. Killing an unarmed civilian with their hands tied after subjecting them to violent investigation can never be found compatible with IHRL.

The incidents that occurred in Bucha and the surrounding area during the period of the Russian occupation are now under investigation by the ICC. These incidents have attracted the most attention, but they were not the only ones documented for the period under scrutiny in this report. In another detailed report published on 18 May 2022, 340 Human Rights Watch informed about extrajudicial killings and other atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces in 17 towns and villages in the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions. For instance, on 14 March 2022, two 17-year-old twin brothers and their 18-year-old friend were allegedly shot dead by the passing Russian military convoy in the Mokhatyn village in the Chernihiv region, without any evident military justification.

Other regions and areas in Ukraine which were temporarily occupied by the armed forces of the Russian Federation report civilian deaths, including clear instances of extrajudicial killings. For instance, in the Sumy region, some 100 civilians died during the occupation, according to the head of the regional military administration, Dmytro Zhivitskiy. Again, some bodies had their hands tied, were shot in the head and showed signs of torture. 341 Targeting cars in which civilians try to flee to safely has also been common across Ukraine. For instance, on 9 May 2022, the Russian military shot at a car carrying two civilians in Bilohirya, Zaporizhzhia region, killing one person and injuring the other. 342 On 12 May 2022, the Russian military fired at a column of civilian cars, injuring a woman and an 11-year-old child. 343 These incidents, as with those that occurred in the Kyiv region, are difficult to justify by any cogent military reasons and, as such, seem to entail violations of IHRL. The second mission regrets to note that instead of conducting investigation into the allegations of serious crimes, the Russian Federation simply denies these allegations and, in one instance at least, even confers special honours on members of the Russian armed forces who are suspected of having engaged in mistreatment and extrajudicial killings of civilians. 344

The second mission also received alarming news concerning the killings of prisoners of war detained by both parties to the conflict. On 4 April 2022, a video was posted on social media showing a group of Ukrainian soldiers shooting captured Russian soldiers outside a village west of Kyiv. The video showed the killing of one soldier and the bodies of at least three other soldiers, including one with a head wound and his hands tied behind his back, lying already dead next to the victim. 345 According to the verification carried out by New York Times,  the video is authentic and it was filmed on a road north of the village of Dmytrivka, southwest of Bucha. 346 The second mission recalls that extrajudicial killing of prisoners of war, equally as that of civilians, amounts to a violation of the right to life and of IHL and constitutes a war crime. It also recalls that any allegation of extrajudicial killing must be properly investigated and the persons responsible for it must be brought to justice.

The first mission documented several cases of killings of Ukrainian nationals suspected of being marauders, traitors or pro-Russian spies carried out either by Ukrainian civilians (“civilian justice”) or, even, with the involvement of Ukrainian public officials. It stressed that such incidents needed to be properly investigated. The second mission has found limited evidence of new incidents of that type having occurred since 1 April 2022. 347 Yet, the mission notes with concern the view expressed by retired lawyer and major general of Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) Vasyl Vovk that investigating such cases is not a priority for the police. 348 While it is understandable that in the current situation law enforcement agencies are overwhelmed with many different tasks, no cases involving the deprivation of or serious threat to life may be treated as lacking priority.

The use of the death penalty also gives rise to concerns. On 9 June 2022, three foreigners serving in the Ukrainian navy, the UK citizens Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner and a Moroccan citizen Brahim Saadoun, were sentenced to death by a court of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) on charged of violent seizure of power or forcible retention of power (Article 323 of the Criminal Code of the so-called DPR), mercenarism (Article 430 of the Criminal Code) and committing crimes by a group of persons (Article 34(2) of the Criminal Code). The decision is now under appeal in the Supreme Court of the so-called DPR. 349 The trial has been widely condemned by States and international organizations due to its irregularities, the refusal to respect the POW status of the defendants and the sentence imposed on them. At least two other foreigners fighting in the ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces, the US citizens Alexander Drueke and Andy Tai Ngoc Huynh, are at risk of being sentenced to the death penalty by courts of the so-called DPR as well. 350

The second mission recalls that while the ICCPR and the ECHR still recognize the death penalty as lawful, there has been a clear legal evolution over the past decades to abolish, de jure or de facto,  the death penalty. As of 2022, 109 States have abolished the death penalty de jure and 25 have not been applying it. In its General Comment No. 36 on the right to life, the UN HRC expressed the view that „the abolition of the death penalty is /.../ legally irrevocable". 351 Ukraine abolished the death penalty in 2000 and this penalty thus should not be reintroduced anywhere in its territory. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom,  the ECtHR suggested that the exception for the death penalty foreseen in Article 2 might have been removed and that the figures concerning the ratification of Protocol 13 prohibiting the death penalty in times of war, “together with consistent State practice in observing the moratorium on capital punishment, are strongly indicative that Article 2 has been amended so as to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances”. 352

One of the countries observing, since 1999, a moratorium on the death penalty is the Russian Federation, though certain statements made in the recent months by Russian lawyers and politicians indicate that the country might consider revoking the moratorium and starting using the death penalty again. Particularly worrying in this context are the declarations made with respect to the detained defenders of the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol, especially those belonging to the Azov battalion. The chair of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin referred to those persons as Nazis and war criminals who should stand trial and the Russian Ministry of Justice has petitioned the Supreme Court to declare the Azov battalion a terrorist organization, thus making it easier for Russian courts to prosecute its members on terrorism charges and to potentially impose death penalty on them. 353

The second mission also notes that it is not possible for a State to bypass its international obligations by handing detained persons over to a State which still uses the death penalty (the principle of non-refoulement). 354 The principle applies a fortiori in case of a State handing detained persons over to a non-state actor, including non-state actors under the overall control of that very State.

Finally, the second mission wishes to recall that while IHL does not completely rule out the possibility of the death penalty being imposed in the context of an armed conflict, including by a non-state party to such a conflict, it subjects its imposition to strict conditions. 355 Under the lowest standard contained in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, the execution of capital punishment is only possible upon “previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”. This provision is to be interpreted in light of the IHRL standards, which operate as the lex specialis in this context.

In its General Comment No. 36, the UN HRC stressed that the death penalty may only be applied in case of the most serious crimes, by a court which must “be established by law within the judiciary, be independent of the executive and legislative branches and be impartial” 356 357 and after a process meeting all the fair trial guarantees. “Violation of the fair trial guarantees /.../ would render the sentence arbitrary in nature, and in violation of /the right to life/”. 357 Examples of such violations include the use of forced confessions, the inability of the accused to question relevant witnesses, lack of effective representation involving confidential attorney-client meetings during all stages of the criminal proceedings, failure to respect the presumption of innocence, lack of an effective right to appeal, lack of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence or lack of suitable interpretation. 358

Commenting on the trial with the three foreigners sentenced to death by a court in the so-called DPR, the UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric noted that “since 2015, we have observed that the so-called judiciary within these self-contained republics has not complied with essential fair trial guarantees, such as public hearings, independence, impartiality of the courts and the right not to be compelled to testify”. 359 These words have been echoed by analysts and scholars, who have labelled the trial as a show trial, likening it to the political trial carried out by the Soviet Union in the 1930s. 360 The imposition of the death penalty by courts established by a non-recognized entity, which moreover do not respect the fundamental guarantees of a fair trial thus gives rise to serious concerns and amounts to a violation of IHL, a war crime and, potentially, a crime against humanity. The handing over of detained persons by the Russian military forces to such courts for a trial constitutes, in addition, a violation of the right to life.

2. Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment

The prohibition of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment, as enshrined in Article 7 of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), Article 3 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), and Article 2 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),361 constitutes one of the most fundamental human rights. This right is absolute and does not allow for derogation, even in times of armed conflict.

• Acts of torture committed against persons protected under the Geneva Conventions amount to a war crime (Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute).
• Acts of torture committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with the knowledge of this attack, are crimes against humanity (Article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute).362

Torture is also prohibited under IHL (International Humanitarian Law). Inhuman and degrading treatment differs from torture by the degree of severity, but it is equally prohibited under IHRL (International Human Rights Law) and IHL.

Evidence of Mistreatment

The second mission has come across extensive evidence demonstrating that torture or inhuman and degrading treatment has been used by the Russian armed forces against Ukrainian civilians and, to a lesser degree, by the Ukrainian armed forces against Russian prisoners of war. The first mission documented relatively isolated cases of mistreatment of concrete civilians, mostly journalists, human rights defenders, or former veterans, at the hands of the Russian armed forces.

The second mission regrets to note that it has documented a pattern of serious mistreatment of local civilian inhabitants of areas under the temporary control of the Russian armed forces. The evidence suggests that such areas were usually turned into lawless zones, where civilians were left at the complete mercy of the Russian soldiers occupying the area. The second mission is not able to determine with certainty whether this situation resulted from a coordinated plan or from the disorganization of the Russian troops. Yet, it notes that in the two cases, the Russian Federation is responsible for all the acts of mistreatment carried out by its armed forces, including those acting ultra vires (beyond their legal power), and that it also has the obligation to investigate such instances and hold concrete individuals having engaged in mistreatment responsible.

Instances in Occupied Territories (Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel)

Instances of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment have been reported from all territories which were or have been temporarily occupied by the Russian armed forces. Again, the towns of Bucha, Irpin or Hostomel became witness to some of the most extensive and serious instances of this type during the Russian occupation in the first weeks of the conflict.

• According to the statement made by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Irina Venediktova, on 28 April 2022, “in a short period of time, investigations revealed that during the occupation of Bucha these very persons took unarmed civilians hostage, tortured them with hunger and thirst, kept them on their knees with their hands tied and their eyes taped, humiliated, and beat them.”363 She also provided a list of 10 Russian soldiers who are suspected of the involvement in those events.364
• According to the testimonies provided by the local inhabitants, the Chechen forces (Kadyrovtsi) were heavily involved in many of the atrocities.365
• One of the victims in Bucha was the local inhabitant Vasily Nedashkivskyi, who was detained by the Russian armed forces in his home and later found dead. He had marks consistent with abuse, strongly suggesting that he was tortured and summarily killed.366
• The five bodies found in the basement of a children’s sanatorium in Bucha also showed signs of mistreatment, and there are suggestions that this basement might have served as a torture chamber during the Russian occupation.367

The events there and in the other Kyiv suburbs are now under investigation not only by the Ukrainian authorities but also by the ICC. After a visit to Bucha, the ICC Prosecutor, Karim Ahmad Khan, called the place a “crime scene”, concluding that there were reasonable grounds to believe war crimes were committed in the region.368 The second mission regrets to note that the Russian Federation itself continues to fail to conduct a proper investigation of the events.

Mistreatment in Kherson Region

Mistreatment of civilians by members of the Russian armed forces has been reported from other temporarily occupied territories as well, including the Kherson region. According to the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Tamila Tasheva, “about 600 people /.../ are in basements, in specially equipped rooms, in torture chambers.”369

• The BBC gathered witness testimonies from persons who passed through such places.370 One victim, Oleksander Guz from the village of Bilozerka, reported being beaten and suffocated during questioning.371
• The local journalist Oleh Baturin was subject to beating and a mock execution, and had four ribs broken in the beating in the meantime.372

Similar stories have been told by witnesses from other regions.373

Filtration Centres

The second mission is also gravely concerned by the mistreatment to which Ukrainian civilians are purportedly subject in the so-called filtration centres. People evacuated from besieged cities, like Mariupol, or people relocating from the temporarily occupied territories have to go through these centres where their personal data is recorded, their fingerprints are taken and their IDs copied.

• There are reports indicating that people are subject to harsh interrogations and humiliating body searches.374 The interrogations and searches seem to be aimed at establishing whether the persons have fought on the Ukrainian side, have any connections to the Azov battalion or have close links to the Ukrainian governments.
• If this is found to be so, those persons are separated from others and often simply disappear. Some are allegedly transferred to the territories of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR/LPR), where they are detained or even murdered.375

This practice, which is somewhat reminiscent of the extraordinary renditions used in the so-called war against terrorism,376 suggests that the Russian Federation is indeed using the two proxy entities to bypass its international obligations.

According to Yevhenii Tsymbaliuk, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the OSCE, there are around 20 such facilities on the territories occupied by the Russian Federation.377 The filtration centre located in the place symptomatically called Bezimenne (meaning "without any name"), in the Donetsk region, has become particularly well known. The forces of the Territorial Defence of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic indicated that by 17 May 2022, more than 33,000 people had passed through that centre.378 When interviewed by the press or non-governmental organizations, these people commonly confirm that filtration entails personal identification, interrogation (with a likely presence of the FSB personnel) and personal search.379

According to the Russian sources, these measures are aimed at preventing “Ukrainian nationalists from infiltrating Russia disguised as refugees so they could avoid punishment.”380 That confirms that the Bezimenne centre is used as a checkpoint before the displacement of Ukrainian civilians, who pass through the filtration, into the territory of the Russian Federation. Those who do not pass, as already noted, are transferred to some detention facilities at the territory controlled by the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic or disappear without trace. Such practice, especially with respect to the latter category of persons, is clearly incompatible with IHRL.

Allegations of Experiments and POW Mistreatment

On 11 May 2022, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation informed that it was allegedly in possession of evidence demonstrating that the US Ministry of Defence conducted inhuman experiments on Ukrainian citizens hospitalized at the psychiatric hospital N. 1 in the village of Strelechye in the Kharkiv Region. The main group involved in the experiments should be male patients aged 40-60 who would be exposed to tests of extreme physical exhaustion.381 Earlier, the same ministry reported that potentially hazardous biological agents had been tested on patients at Kharkiv’s regional clinical psychiatric hospital N. 3. The second mission has not been able to verify this information which, if proven correct, would constitute a violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

In addition to civilians, prisoners of war (POWs) have also been occasionally subject to mistreatment, also by the Ukrainian armed forces.

• The incident having occurred in the village of Vilkhivka in the Kharkiv region on 27 March 2022, where Russian prisoners of war were, according to a video posted on internet, beaten and shot in legs, was reported by the first mission already.382
• Another incident, involving mistreatment and extrajudicial execution of at least four Russian prisoners of war close to the village of Dmytrivka, was reported above.383
• Ukrainian prisoners of war detained by the Russian forces also purportedly get subject to mistreatment, as described by the recently released Ukrainian paramedic Yulia Payevska.384
• Moreover, videos showing prisoners of war continue to be posted on public channels and social media, exposing those prisoners to public curiosity in what could amount to degrading treatment.385

All those incidents need to be properly investigated and if allegations of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment are confirmed, the relevant persons must be held responsible. The same applies to the allegations of mistreatment of persons believed to be marauders, bootleggers, spies, pro-Russian supporters or curfew violators in the territory under the control of Ukraine, to which attention was drawn by the first mission.386

3. Right to Liberty and Security

Another human right which has come under pressure in the current conflict, is the right to liberty and security. This right, as enshrined in Article 9 of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and Article 5 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), is not absolute and indeed, Ukraine has derogated from it. Certain guarantees, such as the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the prohibitions against taking of hostages or abductions, and procedural guarantees protecting the liberty of persons remain however in force at all times. 387 “The existence and nature of a public emergency /.../ may be relevant to a determination of whether a particular arrest or detention is arbitrary”. 388 In times of armed conflicts, rules of IHL (International Humanitarian Law) are used for this determination under the ICCPR 389 and in the interpretation of the catalogue of the grounds for the lawful deprivation of liberty under the ECHR. 390 An act of unlawful deprivation of liberty - when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with the knowledge of this attack - may amount to a crime against humanity. 391 Support for the right to liberty and security has also been expressed by the OSCE Participating States (Moscow 1991).

Violations of the right to liberty and security can take many forms. Since the adoption of the UN International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) in 2006 at least, enforced disappearance has been recognized as a particularly serious form of such a violation. It consists of “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law”. 392 Although Russia is not State party to the ICPPED, the prohibition of enforced disappearance can also be inferred from other human rights (right to life, right to liberty and security, right to family life and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment).

The first mission expressed its serious concern at the reports about Ukrainian civilians, who had been detained, abducted, or kidnapped by the Russian armed forces in the first five weeks of the conflict, including journalists, human rights defenders, public officials and civil servants of local authorities. Some of these persons, after being held incommunicado for some time, were later released, others were found dead or are still missing. The second mission has not been in a position to establish the whereabouts of all the specific individuals reported missing in the first report. At least two of those persons have however already been released. One is the bishop of the Word of Life Church Dmitry Bodya, who was abducted from his home in Melitopol on 19 March 2022 393 and released approximately a week later. He reported that while held incommunicado, he was questioned by the Russian secret service and military, who suspected him of being an FBI agent, due to his dual (US-Ukrainian) citizenship. 394 The second is the mayor of the town Stara Zbur’ivka in the Kherson region Viktor Maruniak, who was detained and abducted by the Russian armed forces on 21 March 2022 395 and released three weeks later, having been held incommunicado and subject to serious mistreatment. 396

Other individuals whose abduction in the early days of the conflict was not reported in the first mission have also been released. Probably the best-known among them is the Ukrainian paramedic Yulia (Taira) Payevska. Payevska, who had acquired a country-wide reputation through her medical work during the Maydan events in 2014 and in Donbas after 2014, went to Mariupol at the beginning of the conflict to provide medical help to those in need there. She was detained and abducted by the forces from the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and held for more than two months in a camp. Soon after her detention, she was shown on Russian TV - she was presented as a Nazi sympathizer and a monster, who used the work of a medic as a cover for espionage. She was finally released in mid-June 2022. 397 The whereabouts of many other persons detained in the early weeks of the conflict remain, however, unknown. This is the case of the mayor of Hola Prystan in the Kherson region, Oleksandr Babych 398 or of the teacher Viktoria Andrusha from the Chernihiv region, who was detained in late March 2022 on account of her alleged reporting to the Ukrainian authorities about the movement of the Russian troops. 399

According to the figures that the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) kindly shared with the mission, by 28 May 2022, there were 222 verified cases of conflict-related detention and enforced disappearance reportedly perpetrated by Russian armed forces and affiliated armed groups of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. 400 The second mission notes that there seems to be a relatively consistent pattern of behaviour on the side of the Russian Federation, when the military occupation of a certain area is followed by abductions, interrogations, mistreatment and sometimes killings of important public figures, such as mayors or local journalists. More recently, moreover, the same practices have been employed with respect to persons who seek to evacuate from besieged places, such as the city of Mariupol. In this latter case, individuals are not abducted from their homes but get detained during the filtration procedure at the filtration centres and, as already noted, are brought from there to detention places in Russia or, more commonly, in the territory under the control of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. In the two cases, detained and abducted persons are usually held incommunicado, have no contact with their families and are subject to various forms of mistreatment. The second mission has no doubts that such practices violate IHRL and may amount to a crime against humanity or a war crime.

The second mission notes that the same applies with respect to the individuals allegedly detained, and sometimes disappeared, by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, especially the Security Service of Ukraine. By 28 May 2022, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) recorded 12 such cases but most of the persons concerned had been either released or their relatives received a confirmation of the detention. The whereabouts of the remaining ones are not known.

The first mission also expressed concern over the reports about the detention of large numbers of Ukrainian civilians and their massive displacement to the areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation or, even, to Russia’s own territory. It noted that by 1 April 2022 between 300,000 and 500,000 Ukrainian citizens had been deported to Russia according to the various sources from both countries. 401 The report concluded that if those deportations were forcible (including because Russia created a coercive environment in which civilians had no other choice than to leave for Russia), they would amount to a violation of IHL and a war crime. It also recalled that deportation and forcible transfer of population, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with the knowledge of this attack, constitutes a crime against humanity. 402

The second mission regrets to note that since 1 April 2022, the number of Ukrainian civilians deported from the occupied territories to Russia has continued to rise. The numbers of the affected civilians differ depending on the source of information. UNHCR estimates that 1,136,243 Ukrainian citizens had crossed the border to Russia by 9 June 2022. 403 According to the information provided by the former Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmila Denisova, Russia had deported 1,377,925 Ukrainians to its territory, including 232,480 children by 21 May 2022. 404 By 14 June, 2022, this number further increased to 1,700,000 Ukrainians, including 276,000 children. 405 As stated in the first report, Russia denies accusations that the Russian military is forcibly deporting Ukrainian citizens to Russia. 406 On the other hand, it acknowledges that the transfers are taking place. On 23 May 2022 the Head of the National Centre for Defence Control of the Russian Federation Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, stated that Russia has transferred a total of 1,426,979 Ukrainians, including 238,329 children since the start of the war. 407

In its Resolution A/HRC/S-34/L.1 adopted on 12 May 2022, the UN Human Rights Council urged the Russian Federation “to provide representatives and staff of international human rights and humanitarian institutions, including United Nations specialized agencies, with unhindered, timely, immediate, unrestricted and safe access to persons who have been transferred from conflict-affected areas of Ukraine and are held on the territory of the Russian Federation or areas controlled or occupied by the Russian Federation, and to share with relevant parties a comprehensive list of such transferred persons”. 408 To the knowledge of the mission, the Russian Federation has not so far undertaken any steps to comply with this request. The second mission is aware that there have been several humanitarian corridors from some of the hardest-hit localities opened since 1 April 2022, most of them leading to the territories under the control of Russia. In some cases, the Ukrainian civilians used these corridors individually as it was the safest way under current security conditions. In other cases, they were taken by evacuation buses to the villages, located in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics or the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In certain situations, it was not physically possible to transfer the civilians to any other places than aforementioned, because of the security situation on the frontline. After the weeks spent without food, water, and medical supplies in the shelters under the shelling, many of the civilians were desperate to leave, irrespective of the final destination.

Yet, as already indicated above, taking the evacuation road towards Russia or the two so-called People’s Republics conventionally means passing through so-called filtration centres, such as the Bezimenne centre in the Donetsk region. The mission wishes to reiterate its special concern over the mistreatment to which individuals are subject in such centres and over the fate of those civilians who do not pass through the filtration procedure.

Those civilians who pass through the filtration procedure are issued some kind of “travel voucher” for evacuation to Russia. Based on this document, they are relocated to the so-called Temporary Accommodation Points (Пункты Временного Размещения), which include dozens of sanatoriums, former children’s wilderness camps and similar facilities that are located all across the Russian Federation including Russian Far North (Murmansk), Siberia (Irkutsk) and Far East (Kamchatka). 409 According to the reports, the Ukrainian citizens can get officially employed through Russian employment centres, 410 in some cases they are also promised free housing, reduced mortgage rates and relocation support. 411 They can apply for “temporary asylum” (Временное убежище) in the country. In general, the Temporary Accommodation Points are functioning in the open mode and their inhabitants are free to leave them, but they often do not have enough information, money for transport, functioning mobile phones, etc. The mission recognizes as especially difficult the situation of those who do not possess any valid personal documents because they were lost or destroyed during the evacuation or the deportation. Several NGOs from Ukraine and Russia are involved in helping the Ukrainian civilians deported to the Russian Federation to leave for the EU or other third countries if they so wish.

The Ukrainian authorities have already launched an investigation into more than 20 criminal cases concerning the forced transfer of people to Russia and Belarus according to the Prosecutor-General Iryna Venedyktova. 412 The investigation is ongoing and focuses mainly on the forcible deportation of children to Russia as she looks to build a genocide indictment against Moscow. 413 The mission is indeed worried about the situation of the children being transferred to Russian-occupied territories and Russia (for more details, see Section V.C.2).

4. Right to a Fair Trial

Similar to the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, which is enshrined in Article 14 of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and Article 6 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), is derogable and has been derogated by Ukraine in the current conflict. Again, similarly as for the previous right, however, the basic guarantees of a fair trial may never be fully suspended.414 In the situation of armed conflict, moreover, States may not derogate those elements of the right to a fair trial which are explicitly guaranteed under IHL (International Humanitarian Law).415 The crucial importance of the right to a fair trial has been repeatedly confirmed by the OSCE Participating States (Ljubljana 2005, Helsinki 2008).

The first mission paid a relatively limited attention to the right to a fair trial, noting that it had not received information indicating that the operation of the judicial system would have been seriously disrupted or that the guarantees to a fair trial would not be respected in the territories under the control of Ukraine. It also noted the number of cases of alleged war crimes or other serious offences, in which investigation had been opened by the Ukrainian authorities. Finally, it expressed concerns at the lack of information related to the operation of the judicial system in the territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation, including the territories of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.

In the period under the scrutiny in the second report (1 April - 25 June 2022), the right to a fair trial has become much more relevant. The main reason is that both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the latter acting through the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, have conducted the first trials with individuals suspected of having committed war crimes or certain other offences during the current conflict.

Trials in Ukraine

As to Ukraine, by 25 June 2022, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine registered almost 20,000 criminal cases relating to crimes under international law. 18,805 concern war crimes, 73 the act of aggression, 18 war propaganda and 634 are others.416

By the same date, the second mission received information about two trials resulting in conviction.

• The first one took place in Kyiv in May 2022. The defendant, a 21-year-old Russian soldier Vadim Shish(i)marin417 was charged with the offence of “Violation of the laws and customs of war” (Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) for having shot, on 28 February 2022, a 62-year-old Ukrainian man Oleksander Shelipov. Shish(i)marin pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 23 May 2022 to life imprisonment.418 (Note: Despite the sentence, his exchange for a Ukrainian prisoner of war remained an option.419)
• The second trial took place in the Poltava region at the end of May 2022. Two Russian soldiers, Alexander Bobikin and Alexander Ivanov, accused of shelling civilian sites, were found guilty and sentenced to 11 years and 6 months in prison.420

On 24 June 2022, the first trial pertaining to conflict-related sexual violence started in Kyiv. The defendant, the 32-year-old Russian soldier Mikhail Romanov, is accused of having repeatedly raped a woman after murdering her husband. The trial is being held in absentia (in his absence),421 as the defendant has probably returned to Russia. Another trial started on the same day with respect to a group of eight Russian soldiers accused of violence against civilians.422 At the time of the completion of this report, these trials were still ongoing. In view of the number of cases registered in the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, it may be expected that many will be opened in various courts across Ukraine in the upcoming weeks and months.423

Concerns Regarding Fair Trial Guarantees in Ukraine

The trials have, in the majority, produced positive reactions. Yet, words of caution can also be heard, especially within the legal academia.424 The respect of the fair trial guarantees during the trials gives rise to doubts:

• It is not clear how the confession of the three defendants was obtained and whether it was truly voluntary.
• It was reported that the first defendant’s lawyer was not informed about the hearings and could not attend some of them.
• The presumption of innocence might not have been truly respected, with the defendants being generally considered as guilty from the beginning of the trial and with them being put in special glass cages in the courtroom.
• Concerning the decision, it has been argued that the Ukrainian courts have not paid sufficient attention to the rule on superior order425 and that the sentence imposed on the first defendant, life imprisonment, appears disproportionate and, in view of the de facto irreducible nature of this sentence, might involve a violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.426
• It is moreover worrying that the Ukrainian organs seem to focus on Russian crimes exclusively, treating the allegations of crimes committed by the Ukrainian soldiers as less important and less urgent.427

Trials in the Russian Federation and DPR/LPR

The first trials for alleged war crimes have started in the Russian Federation as well. On 7 June 2022, the Ukrainian Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Plotnikov was accused by the Russian Investigative Committee of “Cruel treatment of civilians and the use of prohibited methods of warfare” for having ordered shelling of residential buildings in the Donetsk region. At the time of the completion of this report, the trial was still ongoing. The concerns raised above, pertaining to the respect of fair trial guarantees, apply here as well. Moreover, the Russian Federation also seems to concentrate on the alleged violations committed by the other side to the conflict exclusively, thus failing to abide by the obligation to search for and bring before its courts all persons alleged to have committed war crimes, regardless of their nationality.428

However, the most worrying are the trials held by courts in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. As already noted above, the first of such trials, held before a court in Donetsk, resulted in the sentence of death penalty being imposed, on 9 June 2022, to three foreigners serving in the Ukrainian navy: the UK citizens Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner and a Moroccan citizen Brahim Saadoun.429 At least two other foreigners fighting in the Ukrainian armed forces, the US citizens Alexander Drueke and Andy Tai Ngoc Huynh, may receive the same sentenced in the upcoming weeks.430

In addition to the legal problems surrounding the death penalty, the trials are also hardly compatible with the right to a fair trial. One week after the end of the first trial, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet expressed “concerns that fair trial guarantees were not complied with, including that the defendants in the cases were not able to present a full defense”.431 She also recalled that “the so-called ‘courts’ in this area have long failed to comply with international standards, including the general right to a public hearing, the principles of independence and impartiality and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself”.432

The second mission moreover once again reiterates that it is not possible for States to bypass their international obligations by handing detained persons over to another State or, even less, a non-state entity under their overall control, where there is a serious risk that the handed over detainees would face an unfair trial or could be imposed the death penalty. Moreover, even if the Russian Federation seeks to distance itself from the two so-called People’s Republics, as was well visible in the reaction of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the judgment pertaining to the three foreigners,433 it is evident that in reality it exercises (at least) an overall control over the actions carried out by these entities. The Russian Federation is thus clearly responsible for violations of the fundamental judicial guarantees in trials carried out by courts in the two entities, whether it is through handing over detainees to them or through the direct attributability of the acts of such courts to Russia. It is up to the International Court of Justice or another judicial institution to determine the nature of the relationship between Russia and the two entities in more detail.

5. Rights to Freedom of Expression

The right to freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 19 of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and Article 10 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), derogated from by Ukraine, as well as in the OSCE commitments (Helsinki 1975, Istanbul 1999, Astana 2010, Milan 2018), entails the rights to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without any interference. Journalists and media more broadly enjoy special attention, due to the crucial role they play in a democratic society.434 They are also in need of special protection in times of armed conflict, as they often operate close to the areas of active hostilities and even if they do not, their task of bringing to the public objective information may make them exposed to mistreatment, intimidation, harassment, abductions, unlawful detention, and other measures involving violence.

The first mission documented various instances of such behaviour in the conflict in Ukraine. It collected information about five journalists being killed and several other abducted by 1 April 2022. Since then, the numbers have continued to rise.

• According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which monitors the situation on a regular basis, 12 journalists have been killed in Ukraine since the outbreak of the conflict.435
• The Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information informs that nearly 32 journalists have lost their lives over that period.436

The most recent incident involved the killing of the French cameraman Frederic Leclerc-Imhoff, working for the French privately owned broadcaster BFMTV, who died, when the Russian armed forces started to shell the humanitarian convoy on the road to the town of Lysychansk, in the Luhansk region, on 30 May 2022.437 The incident is now under investigation, as a potential war crime, both in Ukraine438 and in France.439

Killed Journalists and Targeting

The other journalists killed since the outbreak of the conflict are Ihor Hudenko (26 February 2022, Kharkiv), Yevhenii Sakun (1 March 2022, Kyiv), Viktor Dedov (11 March 2022, Mariupol), Oksana Haidar (11 March - 7 April, Shevchenkove), Brent Renaud (13 March 2022, Irpin), Maks Levin (missing since 13 March 2022, near Huta-Mezhyhirska), Pierre Zakrzewski (14 March 2022, Horenka), Oleksandra Kuvshynova (14 March 2022, Horenka), Oksana Baulina (14 March 2022, Kyiv), Mantas Kvedaravicius (2 April 2022, Mariupol) and Vira Hyrych (28 April 2022, Kyiv).440 The deaths of three other journalists are under verification by the Committee to Protect Journalists to establish whether they were conflict related. While some of these deaths might be justified under IHL as incidental damage, there are reports suggesting that at least some journalists have been targeted intentionally, and with the knowledge of their special status, in clear violation of IHL and IHRL. All incidents must be properly investigated and those found responsible must be brought to justice. The same applies the cases of journalists who have been detained, abducted, and mistreated.441

Joint Statement and Areas of Concern

On 4 May 2022, a Joint statement on Russia’s invasion and importance of freedom of expression and information was issued by freedom of expression mandate holders from several international organizations (UN, OSCE, African Union, Organization of American States).442 The statement identifies six areas of particular concern for the respect of the right to freedom of expression in the conflict in Ukraine:

Some of these issues, such as the destruction of media infrastructure or the introduction of new war-related offences into the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, were discussed in the report produced by the first mission. The second mission cannot but confirm that these issues - as well as the other ones identified in the Joint Statement - have remained relevant in the period under scrutiny in this report (1 April - 25 June 2022).

• The Russian State-owned media continue to deny that the Russian Federation wages a full-fledged war against Ukraine, adhering to the special military operation label.444 They also fail to inform about the allegations of crimes committed by the Russian armed forces or about the first trials with members of such armed forces taking place in Ukraine.
• Media, internet providers or social networks which make information about the conflict in Ukraine accessible to the Russian public, are threatened with criminal prosecution and asked to remove the information.445
• In the temporarily occupied territories, Ukrainian media are replaced by Russian media and the local inhabitants only have access to the latter.446
• Schools in such territories have to adopt Russian curricula and present the conflict in Ukraine in accordance to the Russian official interpretation.447

As a result of these developments, the Russian public and the inhabitants of territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation live nowadays in a completely different information space than the inhabitants of the unoccupied regions of Ukraine and of European countries.

6. Other Civil and Political Rights

The second mission shares the view expressed by the first mission that the conflict in Ukraine has affected the enjoyment of virtually all civil and political rights. It also concurs that certain rights have been hit more clearly and profoundly than others. Such rights encompass inter alia the right to freedom of assembly, the right to freedom of association, the right to freedom of movement, the right to private and family life and the right to property. All these rights have been derogated from under the ICCPR and the ECHR by Ukraine.

Right to Freedom of Assembly

The right to freedom of assembly, granted by Article 21 of the ICCPR, Article 11 of the ECHR and by OSCE commitments, “enables individuals to express themselves collectively and to participate in shaping their societies”.448 It applies to peaceful assemblies including those that are “used to pursue contentious ideas or goals”.449 Assemblies should not be dispersed, unless relevant and sufficient reasons exceptionally require to do so.450 When taking any measures against peaceful assemblies, law enforcement agents should use the minimal amount of force necessary.451

The first mission expressed doubts as to whether these standards have been respected, especially in the territories under the temporary control of the Russian Federation. The second mission shares those doubts. There are reports indicating that peaceful assemblies protesting against the Russian occupation, for instance those regularly organized in the town of Kherson, continue to be dispersed with the use of tear gas and stun grenades and with Russian soldiers shooting in the air.452 This was confirmed to the mission by local inhabitants from the Kherson region met during the visit to Kyiv. The mission wishes to reiterate that dispersing a peaceful assembly and, even more, using disproportionate force to do so, amounts to the violation of the right to freedom of assembly.

Right to Freedom of Association

The right to freedom of association, granted by Article 22 of the ICCPR, Article 11 of the ECHR, Article 8 of the ICESCR and the OSCE commitments, encompasses the right to join or leave an association and to take collective actions within this association. It applies to all different types of associations,453 including political parties, trade unions, religious associations, or non-governmental organizations. The dissolution of an association should only be possible as a last resort measure, when an association “uses violence or threatens civil peace and the democratic constitutional order of the country”.454

The first mission expressed its concern with respect both to the extension of the repressive legislation against so-called foreign agents, in force in the Russian Federation, to the areas under the effective control of Russia, and to the decision by Ukraine to suspend the operation of 11 political parties.455

The second mission has learnt that further steps, giving rise to concerns, have been taken in some of these areas in the period under the scrutiny. On 3 May 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted an amendment to several legal acts relating to political parties,456 which was signed into law by President Zelenskyy 11 days later.457 The law prohibits political parties which justify, recognize as legitimate or deny the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Based on this law, 10 political parties have already been dissolved and some 7 more are expected to be dissolved in the upcoming weeks.458 The proceedings are held behind closed doors and reveal certain other irregularities, which has produced doubts as to their compatibility with IHRL.459

The situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, conversely, seems to be resolved, and secured, by the decision of this very church made on 27 May 2022, to cut ties with and declare independence from the Moscow Patriarchate460 and to also seek autocephaly.461

Right to Freedom of Movement

The right to freedom of movement, recognized by Article 12 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, has been seriously impeded, both due to the risks stemming from the travel in certain parts of Ukraine and the legal restrictions imposed. The former restrictions concern inter alia the travel from newly occupied territories, such as the Kherson region. When leaving the Kherson region, it is necessary to pass through as many as 60 check points, which often involve detailed body and car inspections.462 The latter restrictions, imposed by Ukraine, encompass curfews declared in various areas463 or the prohibition for men in the military age (18-60 years) to leave Ukraine.464 Abductions, enforced disappearances and the deportations of Ukrainian civilians to Russia also interfere with this right.

Right to Private and Family Life

The conflict in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the right to private and family life, as granted by Article 23 of the ICCPR and Article 8 of the ECHR. People have lost their relatives, friends and colleagues or they have been at least separated from them.465 Furthermore, over 12 million Ukrainians have left their homes. The privacy of individuals has been often disrespected, for instance through various security checks and the dire situation in the so-called filtration centres. The second mission recalls that there is a positive obligation for States to try to minimize the impact of an armed conflict on private and family life, but it also shares the view that the content of this obligation must be interpreted in light of the severe emergency that Ukraine faces.

Right to Property

Another right the enjoyment of which has been heavily affected by the current conflict, is the right to property. Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, qualifies not only as a violation of IHL and a war crime466 but also as a violation of the right to property.

There is credible evidence confirming that the current conflict has been the scene of many instances of such extensive destruction and appropriation of property. This has been particularly serious in the areas under the temporary occupation of the Russian Federation, where numerous cases of pillage, confiscation of private property and organized robbery of basic commodities, such as grain, have been documented.467

The first mission informed about the adoption by Ukraine of the Law on the Basic Principles of Forcible Seizure of Objects of Property Rights of the Russian Federation and its Residents in Ukraine.468 This law entitles Ukraine to confiscate, without compensation, property located in Ukraine and owned by Russia. On 12 May 2022, the first decision was adopted under this law, directed against several daughter branches of Russian banks.469

Moreover, on 12 May 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts on Improving the Effectiveness of Sanctions Related to the Assets of Individuals.470 This law makes it possible for the Ukrainian authorities to confiscate, without compensation, assets of natural or legal persons who support the aggression against Ukraine. The assets confiscated under this law should be used for the compensation of the war damage.471 The second mission stresses that any confiscation of property, especially when no compensation is provided, may only take place if the clear conditions set in the legal framework are met and upon the decision of a competent judicial body.

b. Impact of the Conflict on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The first mission concluded that the conflict in Ukraine had had a profound impact on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights. It stated that “by causing a high level of destruction and forcing millions of persons to leave their homes, the conflict has interfered with the provision of services which are vital for the normal functioning of a society, such as the educational, healthcare or social security systems”.472 It further stated that the conflict had threatened the food and water security and had left long-lasting marks on the state of the environment. The second mission notes that the evidence collected for the period under scrutiny in this report (1 April - 25 June 2022) fully corroborates these findings. It also stresses that some of the violations of ESC rights may at the same time constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity (e.g., extensive destruction of environment or starvation of local population).

Unlike civil and political rights, ESC rights may not be derogated from in times of emergency. Yet, this is compensated by the fact that they are subject to a progressive realization, dependent on the available resources. Even in an emergency, States must do their best, to the extent possible, to work towards the progressive realization of ESC rights, they must guarantee the minimum content of the core obligations and they must not discriminate in the access to these rights. The ESC rights also give rise to various positive obligations (to protect and to fulfil), the content of which is heavily impacted by the situation of an armed conflict.

1. Right to Education

The right to education is enshrined in Article 13 of the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR,473 several treaties applicable to certain categories of individuals474 as well as in the OSCE Commitments. The importance of securing the right to education even in times of armed conflict is explicitly acknowledged in UN Security Council Resolution 2601 adopted in 2021,475 which condemns the military use of schools and attacks on schools in violation of IHL and calls upon all States to “safeguard, protect, respect, and promote the right to education, including in armed conflict”.

The second mission regrets to note that the conflict continues to have a negative impact on the right to education. This negative impact manifests itself in several different ways:

A. Military Use and Destruction of Educational Institutions

First, schools, universities and other educational institutions are used for military purposes and/or become, deliberately or incidentally, object of military attacks. The Head of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) Matilda Bogner stated that the HRMMU has “received information that in many areas armed forces - from both sides - have been using schools as their bases and have placed heavy military equipment in the vicinity of schools”.476 The second mission also recalls that “it is unlawful to use a school simultaneously as an armed stronghold and as an educational center”.477

Concerning the destruction of educational institutions, according to a specially dedicated site established by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, by 25 June 2022, 2061 such institutions had suffered bombing and shelling and 212 of them had been destroyed completely.478 The mission recalls that the destruction of educational institutions can only be compatible with international standards if either these institutions are used for military purposes or they are incidentally hit in actions carried out in full respect of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions. The failure to meet these criteria amounts to a violation of IHL and, potentially, a war crime.

B. Learning Losses and Displacement

Secondly, the conflict has produced serious learning losses. While education resumed since mid-March 2022 in some 86% of schools, it is still mostly carried out via online/distance modalities, and it is not accessible to all children and students. The extensive displacement has caused problems. According to the report produced by the World Bank, some 665,000 students (16% of total number of enrolled students) and over 25,000 educators have left Ukraine and become refugees.480 The long-term effect could be substantial, with future earnings losses of more than 10% a year per student.482

C. Education in Occupied Territories

Thirdly, the situation is particularly complicated in the territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation. According to the data collected by the Ukrainian think tank Cedos, three main alternative models are applied in such territories:483

The second model, reported for instance from the Kherson region, is particularly problematic. Teachers are under pressure to abandon the original curriculum and become a tool of Russian propaganda. If they do not yield to this pressure, they risk measures of retaliation from the occupying forces.484 If they yield to it, they risk being criminally prosecuted by Ukrainian courts for collaborative activities.485 Reports from regions suggest that most teachers prefer to face the first risk.486

The attempts to turn schools situated in the territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation into places of propaganda have become even stronger over the past months. Cedos reports that new subjects, such as Russian language and literature, Social studies or History, are being introduced in schools in the temporarily occupied territories, and they are taught according to Russian textbooks and in Russian.487 On 26 May 2022, Mariupol deputy mayor Petro Andrushenko reported that starting from the fall semester, the education in all city schools will be entirely in Russian and will feature the standard Moscow-approved curriculum.488

2. Right to Health

The right to health is recognized in Article 12 of the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Article 11 of the RESC (Revised European Social Charter), specific human rights treaties489 and the OSCE Commitments. It entails the freedom to control one’s health and body and the entitlement to have access to a system of health protection providing equal opportunity to individuals to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.490

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Ukraine’s health system is under severe pressure.491 This pressure comes from several sources:

A. Attacks on Health Care

First, similar to educational institutions, health institutions are used for military purposes and/or become object of military attacks. As of 25 June 2022, the WHO had reported 332 verified attacks on health care in the country, killing 76 people and injuring 59.492

The WHO reiterated that the conflict had caused “a massive increase in psychological harm and distress’” and stressed that the Russian Federation’s aggression is “causing a serious impediment to the health of the population of Ukraine, as well as having regional and wider than regional health impacts”.493 The WHO condemned attacks on health care and urged the Russian Federation to “immediately cease any attacks on hospitals and other healthcare facilities”.495

B. New Health Risks

Secondly, the conflict has brought about new, hostilities-unrelated health risks. According to the WHO, “the risk of disease outbreaks, such as cholera, measles, diphtheria or COVID-19, has been exacerbated due to lack of access to water, sanitation and hygiene, crowded conditions in bomb shelters and collective centres, and suboptimal coverage for routine and COVID-19 immunizations”.496

• In Mariupol, occupied by the Russian Federation, there is a risk of a major cholera outbreak, due to problems with water supply, surface burials and mixing sewage water with drinking water.497 The mass graves in the occupied territories and decomposition of bodies can also pose a health threat.498
• There is also an increased risk of “physical injury, psychological distress and long-term mental health problems, unwanted pregnancy, STIs, and negative coping strategies such as addiction,”499 whereby the access to some medical services such as psychological and psychiatric support is severely limited.500

C. Blocking of Medicine Supplies

Thirdly, there have been reports of Russia’s blocking supplies of medicine to the temporarily occupied areas.501 Also, during the visit to Kyiv, the mission was informed by the interlocutors from certain temporarily occupied territories, such as the Kherson region, that medicine became unavailable after the arrival of the Russian armed forces or, if available, was sold at exorbitant prices.502

The second mission recalls that under the IHL (International Humanitarian Law) the occupying power “has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics”.503

3. Right to Social Security

The right to social security, recognized in Articles 9 and 10 of the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Article 12 of the RESC (Revised European Social Charter), specific treaties504 and the OSCE Commitments, “encompasses the right to access and maintain benefits /.../ without discrimination in order to secure protection, inter alia,  from (a) lack of work-related income caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, old age, or death of a family member; (b) unaffordable access to health care; (c) insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult dependents”.505

The conflict in Ukraine, especially due to the massive displacement of the population, has made the normal operation of the social security sector very difficult. Prior to the conflict, almost 25% of the government expenditure was spent on social security, with old age pensions accounting for half of this figure. Many people in Ukraine are thus fully dependent on social security and have no alternative source of income. Large portions of the population, such as older persons, continue to collect benefits through post offices or banks due to lower digital literacy.

Impact on Institutional Care Facilities

There is scarcity of information about the conditions of the adult charges of facilities providing residential social services and assisted living, palliative/hospice care, as well as other institutional care facilities. As of 11 April 2022, a total of 2,807 adult residents of around-the-clock social care facilities were evacuated from nine regions due to a threat to their lives and health. Most residents were relocated to appropriate facilities in other regions without active fighting, and about two hundred people were relocated to appropriate facilities abroad.506

According to some reports, the targets of bombing and shelling in the first two months of the full-scale war were often specifically social infrastructure facilities, mainly social care institutions.507 Moreover, Russian troops allegedly took residents of these facilities hostage and forcibly evacuated them to occupied territories. The Atynivka Neuropsychiatric Residential Facility (Sumy Region) was shelled by Russian forces in late April.508 Due to shelling and bombing, many institutional care facilities were cut off from power, heating, water supply and communication, and their windows and doors were damaged, making them unfit for residence and service provision.509

Social Security in Operation and Occupied Territories

The social security system is in operation in most regions of Ukraine. In addition, new social benefits have been put in place since the outbreak of the conflict to the benefit of victims of the conflict, especially those who have been displaced. As previously, the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories, especially older persons and persons with disabilities, experience difficulties having access to their pensions and other social benefits.

4. Right to Food and Water

The right to food is recognized in Article 11 of the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and it “also includes the right to have access to safe drinking water”.510 The first report noted that there was a risk of food and water shortage. In the period under scrutiny in the second report (1 April - 25 June 2022), this risk has become even more acute.

Water Crisis and Targeting Infrastructure

On 15 April 2022, UNICEF reported that 1.4 million people in Ukraine were without running water, whereas additional 4.6 million people were without adequate access to safe water.511 In total, “over 6 million people in Ukraine are struggling every day to have drinking water”.512

• The situation with the access to water is particularly critical in besieged cities such as Mariupol, where over 100,000 people were reported to be without access to drinking water.513
• There have also been reports of the Russian forces deliberately targeting water infrastructure, such as pipes, dams, sewage treatment plants and pumping stations, across the entire country.514

Risk of Starvation and Food Confiscation

The inhabitants of some parts of the country also face the risk of starvation. This is due, first, to the destruction of agricultural equipment, shelling of farms and planting of landmines in the soil by the Russian armed forces.515

Moreover, in some temporarily occupied territories, such as the Kherson region, food, and especially wheat is confiscated by the Russian armed forces and exported to other regions (Crimea) or countries (Turkey), leaving the local inhabitants with limited means of subsistence.516 During the interviews made in Kyiv, the mission was informed that prices had increased several times in such regions and that local inhabitants struggle to make ends meet.517

• The situation is particularly critical in besieged cities such as Mariupol, where people, according to the executive director of the UN World Food Programme David Beasley, were being “starved to death”.518

Although the second mission has not been able to conclude whether starvation of the civilian population has been used as a deliberate strategy by the Russian Federation, there are signs – denial of access for humanitarian aid, blocking of humanitarian corridors, etc. – that it might indeed be so. The second mission recalls that deliberate starvation of the civilian population constitutes violations of IHL and of IHRL as well as a war crime and a crime against humanity.

5. Right to a Healthy Environment

The right to a healthy environment stems from general human rights provisions519 and the OSCE Commitments. The first mission voiced concern as to the potential environmental impact of the conflict. The second mission has also come across worrying evidence suggesting that the conflict has seriously affected the state of Ukrainian environment. The situation is made worse by the fact that, at the moment, ecological concerns are treated as secondary.

Industrial Incidents and Pollution

According to the online map-based platform Ecodozor (established by Zoi Environment Network and supported by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine520), there have been many hazardous industrial incidents recorded in Ukraine, whereby 92 industrial facilities in the high or very high environmental risk category were affected.521 They include inter alia Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants, the Kakhovka and Kyiv hydropower plants, the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, the Toretsk Ferroalloy Plant, metallurgical plants Azovstal and Illicha in Mariupol as well as numerous sea ports, oil storage facilities and coal mines.522

The environmental situation in some occupied territories is worrying due to air, soil and water pollution and deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situations.523

• Satellite images show that large areas in Eastern and Southern Ukraine are engulfed in wildfires sparked by explosions.
• The soil has become contaminated with heavy metals and other potentially dangerous and poisonous substances leaking from missiles, military equipment and spent ammunition.
• Ground waters are polluted by spilled fuel.524
• Reportedly, in Mariupol sewage and storm water runoff goes to the sea without any treatment.525
• Several zoo staff members have been killed, together with the animals in their care, when zoos have been under shelling.526

The second mission thus concludes that the environment is, indeed, a “silent victim” of the conflict.527

C. Impact of the Conflict on Vulnerable Groups

The first mission established that while the conflict in Ukraine had affected the population of Ukraine as a whole, it had had a specific and often particularly heavy impact on individuals belonging to certain vulnerable groups. These groups include, but are not limited to, women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, national and ethnic minorities, LGBTQ people or watchdogs (human rights defenders and other activists). Furthermore, the conflict itself has produced new vulnerable groups, especially internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

In accordance with the principle of non-discrimination,528 individuals belonging to vulnerable groups must not be treated less favourably than other people. To ensure this, States have to take the special needs of those individuals into account. This rule remains in place at all times and can never be suspended. It's important to make sure that those who are vulnerable even in times of normalcy are not made even more vulnerable, or are not even left behind, in times of crisis.

1. Women

The first category of individuals who have been particularly affected by the current conflict in Ukraine encompasses women. Protected by general human rights instruments as well as by the special UN CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women), women must not be subject to any form of negative discrimination. There is an increased need to protect women and girls in times of armed conflicts, as explicitly recognized in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security,529 and especially to “take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse” (para 10).

A. Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

The first mission noted that the outbreak of the conflict had indeed brought about an increase in gender-based violence. The second mission regrets to confirm that this trend has continued. Reports from and about women being raped or otherwise sexually abused by members of the Russian armed forces, especially in the newly occupied territories, have become abundant.530 As of 3 June 2022, the OHCHR had received reports of 124 alleged acts of conflict-related sexual violence across Ukraine, mostly against women and girls.531

It is generally believed that the actual number is much higher. Natalia Karbowska, Co-Founder and Director of Strategic Development for the Ukrainian Women’s Fund, noted that “the Russian Federation is using sexual violence and rape as instruments of terror to control civilians”.532

There are reports indicating instances of gang rape or rape carried out in front of family members. For example, the Commissioner for Human Rights Denisova said that 25 girls aged 14–24 were kept in a basement in Bucha and gang-raped, as a result of which nine became pregnant.534

Women who have been subject to rape or other forms of sexual abuse face a high risk of forced pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS, internal physical injuries and of mental problems.535 Women who became pregnant as a result of a rape may moreover have difficulties getting an abortion, both because of the level of destruction of medical facilities in Ukraine and the strict anti-abortion laws in some of the countries of refuge, especially Poland.536

B. Domestic Violence

Domestic violence against women also seems to be on the rise.537 According to Alyona Krivulyak, one of the leaders of La Strada Ukraine, “hostilities have become a catalyst for the exacerbation of domestic violence in families where these facts existed before the war”.538 Moreover, victims of domestic violence report increasing difficulties to report cases and to have the police and other public authorities pay attention to them due to the workload they have at the moment.539

C. Displacement and Trafficking Risks

As already noted by the first mission, women and girls also make up the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons. When on the move or in temporary shelters, women and girls are exposed to an increased risk of gender-based violence, including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, as well as the risk of human trafficking.

• On 6 June 2022, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten stated that the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine was gradually turning into a trafficking crisis.540
• UNHCR warned that refugees fleeing from Ukraine face “the risks of predators and criminal networks who may attempt to exploit their vulnerability or lure them with promises of free transport, accommodation, employment or other forms of assistance”.541
• There are reports of women and girls being offered shelter only in exchange for sexual services.542

On 3 May 2022, the Framework on cooperation between the Government of Ukraine and the UN on prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence was signed in Kyiv.544 The Framework is directed at the prevention and repression of sexual violence perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict.545

The second mission also draws attention to the difficult situation that women who stay in their homes, including older women, face. These women often find it difficult to meet their basic needs, as they have limited access to food, water, heating, medical care, social benefits or work. Some 265,000 Ukrainian women were pregnant at the outbreak of the conflict and there are reports that some of them have been giving birth prematurely, due to the conflict-related stress.546 The limited access to female sanitary products and the large-scale displacement of medical staff also causes problems.547

2. Children

Children, i.e., human beings under the age of 18, are under the protection of general human rights instruments and of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) with its Optional Protocols (OP). Ukraine and the Russian Federation have ratified the CRC and the OPs. By means of Article 38 of the CRC, States must “respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child”. The protection of children in armed conflict has been on the agenda of the UN Security Council and other international organizations.548

The first mission established that the conflict in Ukraine had had a profound impact on the lives and well-being of children. The second mission regrets to note that the situation has not really changed for the better in the period under scrutiny (1 April - 25 June 2022). Around 7.5 million children in Ukraine are suffering because of the conflict.549

A. Direct Victims and Casualties

First, children continue to be among direct victims of the conflict. On the occasion of World Children’s Day, on 1 June 2022, UNICEF reported that on average more than two children are killed and more than four injured each day in Ukraine.550 The actual figures are believed to be much higher.

• The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine reports, by 24 June 2022, a total of 948 child war casualties – 338 killed and 610 wounded.551
• Over 130 children have been reported missing.552
• In Bucha alone, 31 children under the age of 18 were killed and 19 wounded. The chief prosecutor of the Bucha region stated that children were killed or injured deliberately.553
• Furthermore, children are said to be used as human shields by the Russian armed forces.557

B. Sexual Violence and Abuse

Secondly, children have been exposed to other forms of violence and abuse, including sexual violence and rape. By 3 June 2022, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine received 124 allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, with 7 involving boys.558

The Commissioner for Human Rights Denisova stated that a one-year-old boy was raped by Russian soldiers and later died in a village near Kharkiv.559 Other victims have been reported, including "two 10-year-old boys, triplets aged 9, a 2-year-old girl raped by two Russian soldiers, and a 9-month-old baby" raped in front of his mother.560

The Chernihiv Regional Prosecutor's Office identified two servicemen of the Russian armed forces who attempted to rape a 16-year-old girl and tortured her older brother.563 The two servicemen were charged of violating the laws and customs of war (Article 438(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

The mission concludes that sexual violence, including violence against children, has occurred in the conflict, primarily by the members of the Russian armed forces. All these incidents have to be duly investigated.

C. Displacement and Abduction Risks

Thirdly, the conflict has forced more than 12 million people to leave their homes, and a big number of them are children. Children on the move have faced numerous risks, including the risk of human trafficking and exploitation, child labour, forced recruitment and gender-based violence.

On 8 April 2022, the Commissioner for Human Rights Denisova claimed that more than 121,000 children had been taken by force to Russia.564 At that time, UNICEF indicated to have no evidence to support such claims.565

• On 30 May 2022, President Putin signed a decree, simplifying the procedure that enables orphans from Ukraine, including the territories of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic, to obtain Russian citizenship.567
• The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was concerned about alleged plans to allow the movement of children to families in the Russian Federation, which did not appear to include steps for family reunification or respect the best interests of the child.568

There are reports confirming that many children have gone missing and become orphaned. There are also reports about approximately 2,000 children from various orphanages and children’s institutions that have been purportedly transferred to Russia, even though they have living relatives.570 Undocumented children, including newborns, are especially vulnerable if transferred to Russia, as they have little chance of being legalized.

The mission recalls that by virtue of Article 8 of the CRC, States “undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations”. Article 21 of the CRC stipulates that for adoption, the “best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration”, and inter-state adoption is only “an alternative means of child's care”.

D. Disruption of Vital Services and Education

Fourthly, children in Ukraine also suffer due to the disruption of vital services such as food, water and electricity supply, health care or the provision of education. Displaced children face difficulties continuing their pre-war education or accessing psychosocial assistance.571

The problem with the right to education is particularly painful. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science (MESU), as of 2 June 2022, at least 1,888 schools had been damaged or destroyed by shelling and bombing. Many school buildings are used as shelters, or, even, military bases. Schools used as shelters have also been attacked, resulting in casualties.573

Distance learning remains an emergency, short-term solution. As of May 2022, it is estimated that 3.7 million children in Ukraine and abroad are using online and distance learning options. The shortage of teachers is a challenge, with some 40,000 teachers reportedly displaced as of 31 May 2022.574

Moreover, children living in the territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation are exposed to massive propaganda and militarization of education. It was reported that school vacations were cancelled in occupied Mariupol to prepare students for the transition to the Russian curriculum.575

3. Older Persons

Older persons are usually defined as persons over 60 years old or, alternatively, people having reached the retirement age set in the specific country. In Ukraine, such persons constitute around one quarter of the population, and in some areas, like the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, their percentage reaches up to 30%.

While no specific human rights instrument for older persons has been adopted so far within the UN or the Council of Europe, older persons are protected by general human rights instruments, some of which contain specific provisions applicable to them. There is also an increasing number of soft law documents on older persons which should be used as a tool in the interpretation of the general standards.576

The first mission established that older persons had been heavily affected by the current conflict, both as its direct victims (killed or injured) and as its indirect victims (deprived of access to food, clean water, medical care or heating). The second mission confirms that older persons have remained one of the particularly affected vulnerable groups.

On 14 June 2022, OHCHR, together with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), WHO Regional Office for Europe (WHO/Europe) and HelpAge International, noted in a joint statement that “in a country where 1 in 4 people is over 60, the impact on older persons, including those with disabilities, has been dramatic. /.../ To say that the health, rights and well-being of older persons are in danger is an understatement”.577

A. Direct Victims and Extrajudicial Killings

As previously, older persons have become direct victims of the conflict. The Commissioner for Human Rights Denisova stated that “during the war in Ukraine, elderly people who cannot travel to safe regions are forced to live in the occupation or in the besieged cities, where they are tortured and killed by the Russian occupiers”.578

There are reports of concrete seniors being killed, most likely incidentally, by the Russian armed forces. For instance, on 12 May 2022, a 67-year old man died as a result of shelling in the Sumy region.579 On 25 May 2022, a 64-year old man was killed in shelling in Balaklia in the Kharkiv region.580 Civilian losses among older persons have also been reported by the de facto authorities of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.581

The first mission documented cases of older persons being extrajudicially killed by the Russian armed forces, one of which resulted in the very first condemnation for a war crime before the Ukrainian courts: the killing of 62-year old Oleksandr Shelypov by a Russian soldier, Vadim Shishimarin.582

B. Indirect Victims and Hardship

A much larger number of Ukrainian older persons have become indirect victims of the current conflict. Older persons are typically those who stay behind, either because they are unable to leave their homes (due to weak health conditions, limited digital literacy, etc.) or because they are unwilling to do so.583

Those who are left behind face particular hardship, especially close to the areas of active fighting. In addition to the risks stemming from military operations, these persons are exposed to problems linked to the shortage of food, water, heating or medicine and to the limited access to health and social services. Forced separation from the rest of the family and social isolation also takes a heavy toll on their physical and mental state.

C. Challenges in Non-Governmentally Controlled Territories (NGCTs)

Older persons living in the territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities also face special challenges. Prior to the full-fledged Russian attack, older persons in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions lost normal access to the services provided by the Ukrainian government, such as the distribution of pensions.

• To receive their pensions, these persons previously had to register as internally displaced persons and had to travel to governmentally controlled territories at least once in every 60 days. This system resulted in about 30% of seniors (450,000 people) in the Eastern part of Ukraine not receiving their pensions.584
• At least 19 older persons died while seeking to cross checkpoints.585

While Ukraine suspended the regular travel requirement in August 2021, the new system (remote identity verification) has not been fully put in place yet, and inhabitants of the Eastern regions still have to travel to governmentally-controlled territories to receive their pensions.586

The situation seems to be different in the newly occupied territories, such as the Kherson region, where pensions are still delivered, but local inhabitants encounter difficulties, especially when seeking to get their pension in cash.587

Human Rights Watch noted that the process introduced by the Ukrainian government treats pensioners in NGCTs differently from other pensioners and imposes an excessive burden.588 The second mission recalls that under IHL, it is primarily the responsibility of the occupying power to ensure that local inhabitants of the occupied territories have their basic needs secured.589 The territorial State nonetheless maintains a residual obligation to protect human rights of its inhabitants to the extent possible.590

4. Persons with Disabilities

Ukraine is home to some 2,700,000 persons with disabilities (PwD), i.e., “those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”.591

In addition to general human rights protection, they enjoy special protection under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), ratified by both Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Article 11 of the CRPD imposes on States the obligation to “take /.../ all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk”.

This obligation is reconfirmed and elaborated upon by the UN Security Council Resolution 2475 (2019) on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict.592 The resolution, inter alia, requests all States to:

• Protect PwD from violence and abuses (para 1).
• Allow and facilitate safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access to such persons (para 3).
• Provide sustainable, timely, appropriate, inclusive and accessible assistance to them (para 4).
• Take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination and marginalization on the basis of disability (para 8).

On 14 April 2022, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities issued a statement, noting the profound impact that the conflict had on PwD and calling upon the Russian Federation to fully respect the obligations stemming from the CRPD and to immediately end the hostilities.593

Vulnerability and Risk in Conflict

The first mission reported that persons with disabilities, similar to older persons, were often being left behind or decided to stay behind in areas where active hostilities were going on. Information received by the second mission confirms that this trend has continued.

The UN Committee confirmed that “there are ongoing reports that many people with disabilities, /.../, are trapped or abandoned in their homes, residential care institutions and orphanages, with no access to life-sustaining medications, oxygen supplies, food, water, sanitation, support for daily living and other basic facilities”.595

The Committee also noted that “few people with disabilities are reported to be internally displaced or to have reached Ukraine’s borders, indicating that many of them have not been able to flee to safety”.596

Many PwD have thus not been able or willing to escape. They are also often unable or unwilling to seek shelters in cases of emergency, such as air raids. The inability is mostly linked to physical impediments and the inaccessibility of many places, including bunkers and subway stations. The unwillingness may stem from the belief by the persons with disabilities that their lives are dispensable or from their incapacity to understand the situation.

Specific Concerns for Persons in Care Facilities

Particularly worrying is the situation of persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities who, although constituting less than one tenth of the PwD in Ukraine, are strongly represented in long-term care facilities across Ukraine. A large portion of such persons are moreover deprived of legal capacity.597

The second mission stresses the increased vulnerability of such persons and the ensuing obligation of the State exercising control over the territory where those persons live to protect them from any acts of violence and to ensure they have access to all basic commodities (food, water, clothing, medicine, electricity, etc.).

5. National and Ethnic Minorities

The conflict in Ukraine has also affected many national and ethnic minorities living in the territory of Ukraine. By virtue of Article 11 of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine, the State shall promote the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation, as well as the development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.

Article 10 of the Constitution stipulates that while Ukrainian is the State language, the “free development, use, and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine shall be guaranteed” (para 2). The rights of national and ethnic minorities are further recognized in international instruments, notably Article 27 of the ICCPR and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ratified by Ukraine).

A. Russian Language and Identity

The total population of Ukraine currently amounts to some 43.7 million persons. According to the all-Ukrainian census held in 2001, the main minority group was made up by the Russians (17.3%) followed by several other, relatively small groups (Belarussians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Poles, Jews, Hungarians, Armenians, Romanians, Greeks, Roma, and others).

• The 2001 census indicated that 14.8% of ethnic Ukrainians considered Russian their first language.
• The number of persons who consider Ukrainian as their first language has risen from 57% in 2001 to around 80% in 2022.599
• According to a survey, the number of those who communicate only in Russian has dropped by some 10% over the first 2.5 months of the conflict.600

It thus seems that the forced de-Ukrainization601 that the Russian Federation has sought to bring to Ukraine, has in fact resulted in spontaneous de-Russification.602

The mission notes with concern certain moves to limit the access to education in or of Russian. On 17 June 2022, the City Council of Mykolaiv banned the Russian language from secondary educational institutions, both as the language of instruction and as an elective subject.603

Moreover, on 19 June 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted two laws banning music produced in Russia since 1991 from the Ukrainian media and public space and prohibiting the import and distribution of books and other publishing products from Russia, the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, and Belarus.604 The bans are not absolute; for instance, the ban on music should not apply to Russian singers who have condemned the Russian aggression.605 It is important to make sure that the bans do not prevent the Russian minority from having access to cultural products in the Russian language.

B. Discrimination against the Roma People

The first mission noted the negative impact on certain minorities living close to active hostilities, such as the Greek minority and the Turkic-speaking Urums, both concentrated in and around Mariupol. Reports about discrimination against the Roma people have been confirmed by the second mission.

The Roma people have continued to face specific difficulties, as they are sometimes refused places on buses taking people to safety or are not admitted to shelters for internally displaced persons.606 They also find it difficult to leave the country, as some 10–20% of the Ukrainian Roma lack documents to attest their citizenship and residence status (allegedly, some 30,000 Ukrainian Roma have no form of ID).607608

C. Violations in Russian-Controlled Territories

The first mission also drew attention to the violations of rights of national and ethnic minorities, as well as the three ethnic groups declared indigenous peoples of Ukraine (Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks), committed in the territories under the effective control of Russia (Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions). These violations unfortunately continued in the period under scrutiny (1 April - 25 June 2022).

In her report of 4 May 2022, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Marija Pejcinovic Buric, indicated that “consistent reports of abusive measures disproportionately affecting Crimean Tatars continued to underscore the concerns about their deliberate discrimination”.609 These abusive measures include:

• Harassment of Crimean Tatars human rights defenders and representatives.
• Detentions and prosecution on suspicious legal grounds.
• The de facto denial of education in the Tatar language.
• Extensive militarization of schools and school children in Crimea.610

These and other highly problematic measures have also been documented in the materials issued by the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.611

6. LGBTQ Persons

LGBTQ persons experienced specific difficulties in the first weeks of the conflict. The first mission documented the attack on one of the LGBTQ shelters in Kyiv by unknown individuals which took place on 1 March 2022612 and the problems that trans persons were facing when seeking to cross the borders.613 The second mission has not been in the position to find out whether the persons responsible for the attack on the shelter have been identified and brought to justice. The Ukrainian authorities have the obligation to do so, especially since the attack reveals clear signs of homophobia.

A. Incidents of Discrimination and Abuse

The second mission regrets to note that other incidents, albeit not extremely numerous ones, revealing such signs have occurred since 1 April 2022. The Kyiv-based LGBTQ organization Nash Svit Centre reported several incidents:

• A case of detention and abuse of two young gay men by unidentified persons in military uniforms at a checkpoint in Odesa, obviously motivated by their sexual orientation.
• A lesbian couple in Odesa had some of their property destroyed by the owner of the flat they were renting.
• Members and staff of the organization themselves experienced two consecutive attacks (insults and violence) by members of the Kyiv City Territorial Defence.614

All these incidents have to be properly investigated and those responsible for them be held accountable.

There was also at least one instance when a gay man faced problems upon his conscription to the Ukrainian military forces. Under the Regulations on Military Medical Examination in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2008),615 persons diagnosed with transsexualism or gender dysphoria are seen as unfit for military service under certain conditions. One member of the Nash Svit Center was suspected of transsexualism during conscription and sent to the relevant commission, which did not confirm the diagnosis, though it labelled homosexuality as a “sexual disorder”.616

B. Challenges for Trans Persons

Trans persons face certain particular challenges during the current conflict:

• Trans persons whose documents have male markers are not allowed to leave the territory of Ukraine because of the general conscription of men 18-60 years old.
• The same persons are usually not admitted to the military forces (based on the MoD Regulations), even if they want to. Ways to bypass this problem are either to not disclose they are trans persons or to enter the Territorial Defence, where restrictions do not apply.
• Some trans persons undergoing gender transition face the lack of necessary medicine or its financial inaccessibility.

C. Improvement in Public Attitudes

Despite these challenges, the status of the LGBTQ community has also improved in some ways. This can be partly assigned to the ostensibly patriotic pro-Ukrainian attitude that many members of the community have embraced. The overtly homophobic position held by the Russian Federation’s political and religious leadership and Ukraine's conscious effort to distance itself from it have also played a positive role.

The results of a public poll carried out by Nash Svit Center shows that the number of Ukrainians who have negative feelings about LGBTQ people has decreased from 60.4% in 2016 to 38.2% in 2022, while the percentage of those with positive feelings has raised from 3.3% to 12.8%.617 While this trend is positive, it leaves something to be desired.

D. Threats from the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian LGBTQ community continues to feel concerned about and threatened by the homophobic attitudes of the Russian political and religious leadership.

• Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, explicitly named gay parades as one of the main “sins” that forced the Russian Federation to conduct the “special military operation” in Ukraine.618
• On 6 June 2022, a draft amendment to the Code of Administrative Offences was submitted to the Russian State Duma, seeking to extend the prohibition of the so-called LGBT propaganda from propaganda among children to that among all persons.619

If adopted, this draft bill risks to further worsen the situation of the LGBTQ community in the Russian Federation and on the territories under its effective control, where the repressive Russian legislation against LGBTQ persons de jure or de facto applies. Moreover, the attitudes of the Russian society towards LGBTQ persons has been becoming even more negative over the past years.621 While no incidents of mistreatment of Ukrainian LGBTQ persons by the Russian armed forces were brought to the knowledge of the second mission, the risk of such mistreatment should not be underestimated.

7. WATCHDOGS (HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS)

The category of watchdogs encompasses various individuals whose main task is to monitor the situation, establish and reveal truth about contested events, and draw attention to irregularities they may unveil. Human rights defenders (HRD), who act to promote or protect human rights in a peaceful manner, fall under this category.

HRD enjoy special protection under IHRL. The right to promote and strive for the protection and realization of human rights is enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.622 Other activists who qualify as watchdogs include journalists, bloggers, or local representatives. The need for their enhanced protection has been repeatedly confirmed by the OSCE Participating States.

A. Continuing Violations and Reprisals

The first mission documented violations of human rights, including measures of reprisals and retaliation, directed against HRDs and other activists, especially those living in areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation. The second mission confirms that such violations continued in the period under scrutiny (1 April - 25 June 2022) and were extended to newly occupied territories, such as parts of the Kyiv region or the Kherson region.

According to Oleksandra Matviychuk, head of the Kyiv-based Centre for Civil Liberties, “Russians deliberately search for human rights defenders, for journalists, for volunteers, for representatives of local communities”.623

HRD and other activists face various forms of harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention, and prosecution on dubious grounds.

B. Case of Crimean Tatar Lawyers

A concrete example concerns four human rights lawyers representing Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists: Emine Avamileva, Edem Semedliayev, Nazim Sheikhmambetov, and Ayder Azamatov.624

• On 26 May 2022, Edem Semedliayev was detained in Simferopol and charged with “public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Russian Federation’s armed forces” (Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation), allegedly for being tagged in a Facebook post. He was fined 75,000 roubles on the same day.
• Following this trial, Nazim Sheikhmambetov, Semedliayev’s lawyer, was detained and charged with the offence of “organising a mass simultaneous presence of citizens in a public place” (Article 20.2.2 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation), in relation to a public protest that took place in October 2021.
• One day later, on 27 May 2022, his lawyers, Ayder Azamatov and Emine Avamileva, were detained and charged with the same offence and on the same grounds.
• On 28 May 2022, the three of them were found guilty and sentenced to 5–8 days of administrative arrest.625

8. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The current conflict in Ukraine has produced the largest displacement of people in Europe since the end of the World War II. According to data collected by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by 21 June 2022, more than 5.2 million Ukrainians were recorded across Europe and 3.5 million of them applied for temporary residence in another country (mainly the Russian Federation, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary).626

In addition, over 7.1 million Ukrainians, almost one fifth of the population, had been internally displaced (IDPs) inside the country by 22 May 2022, according to the data provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).627 Most IDPs are women (63%), and there is also a high percentage of children and, to a lesser extent, older persons and persons with disabilities.

IDPs are defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border".628 While IDPs do not have a specific status under IHRL, the standards for their protection are enshrined in the non-binding UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.629

A. Protection from Arbitrary Displacement and Discrimination

The first mission recalled the standard prohibiting arbitrary displacement (Principle 6). The reports about instances of forcible deportations of Ukrainian civilians to the territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation or even to the Russian territory, raise doubts about the respect for this standard.

The second mission found evidence of the failure to respect humanitarian corridors and the shelling of civilian persons and vehicles using these corridors.630

Furthermore, IDPs must enjoy protection without any discrimination (Principle 4). The second mission found information about potentially discriminatory treatment of certain categories of IDPs, especially Roma people631, foreigners, older persons632, and persons with disabilities.633

Prior to the Russian attack, Ukraine was home to hundreds of thousands of foreign citizens, including some 76,000 foreign students from Africa and Asia, who allegedly encountered serious difficulties and experienced acts of violence while trying to leave Ukraine (beaten, pushed off buses/trains, forced out of shelters).634 In one incident, a student from Ghana had to leave a shelter near Sumy after a Ukrainian man had complained that sleeping next to a Black person was traumatizing.635 The second mission recalls that the principle of non-discrimination is paramount.

B. Conditions and Right to Return

The conditions during displacement and in temporary shelters often leave much to be desired. As noted by the OHCHR, many IDPs “face shortages of food, water, basic items and energy, and lack access to health services and medication”.636 There are reports of:

• Limited privacy in temporary shelters.
• Difficulties for children pursuing education.
• Instances of gender-based violence against women and girls.
• An increased risk of human trafficking, exploitation, and forced prostitution.
• Widespread trauma and lack of available psychosocial support.

IDPs have the right to “return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes... or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country” (Principle 28(1)). As the conflict localizes, many IDPs and refugees seek to return. Although it is hardly realistic that the Ukrainian authorities could make it possible for all to regain their original property or get compensations (Principle 29(2)), they should do their best to facilitate the return or the resettlement.

C. Legal Framework and Concerns

The first mission drew attention to certain shortcomings in the legal framework applicable to IDPs in Ukraine: the 2014 Law on Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons.637 The second mission was informed that an amendment to this law had recently been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada.638 The primary aim of the draft is to ensure a unified approach to the realization of IDP rights across the whole territory of Ukraine, including the temporarily occupied territories.639

However, the mission recalls that the law suffers from other shortcomings, notably relating to the requirements for registration and the false incentive that the benefits linked to the registration may give to IDPs and certain other persons not to seek the termination of the status (as shown by a study published in 2021).640

The second mission found limited information about the situation of IDPs displaced to territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation. It wishes to express its serious concern regarding the alleged practice of forcing at least some IDPs to pass through the so-called filtration centres, mostly situated in the territories of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, as well as with respect to the unvoluntary relocation of some of these IDPs outside the territory to Ukraine.

D. Conclusions

The first mission in its report concluded that human rights, including the most fundamental ones from which no derogation is possible (right to life, prohibition of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment), had been extensively violated in the first five weeks of the conflict. The second mission has come to the identical conclusion for the period under the scrutiny in this report (1 April - 25 June 2022).

A. Violations of Civil and Political Rights

There is rich evidence confirming that the conflict has seriously affected the enjoyment of civil and political rights, such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, and the right to freedom of expression. Some of the most serious violations encompass:

• Targeted killing of civilians, including journalists, human rights defenders, or local mayors.
• Unlawful detentions, abductions and enforced disappearances of the same categories of persons.
• Large-scale deportations of Ukrainian civilians to Russia.
• Various forms of mistreatment, including torture, inflicted on detained civilians and prisoners of war.
• The failure to respect the fair trial guarantees and the imposition of the death penalty.

Most, although not all, violations have been committed in the territories under the effective control of the Russian Federation, including the territories of the two so-called "People’s Republics," and are largely attributable to the Russian Federation.

B. Alarming New Phenomena

The second mission has identified two alarming phenomena:

C. Impact on Economic and Social Rights and Vulnerable Groups

The second mission concurs with the first mission in concluding that the current conflict has also had a very negative impact on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to education, the right to health, the right to social security, the right to food and water, and the right to a healthy environment.

This impact results not only from direct violations but also from the overall state of destruction and disruption of the provision of vital services. This has made it very difficult for Ukrainian citizens to fully enjoy their rights and for Ukraine to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights.

The conflict in Ukraine has affected all inhabitants, but it has had a particularly negative effect on individuals belonging to vulnerable groups, such as women, children, older persons, or persons with disabilities.

D. Attribution of Responsibility and Crimes Against Humanity

All violations of IHRL entail the responsibility of the relevant State party to the conflict. The most serious among them also give rise to individual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity.

The second mission shares the doubts about whether the Russian attack per se could qualify as a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.” Yet, it fully upholds the conclusion that some patterns of violent acts violating IHRL, which have been repeatedly documented during the conflict, such as targeted killing, enforced disappearance, or abductions of civilians, meet this qualification. Any single violent act of this type, committed as part of such an attack and with the knowledge of it, constitutes a crime against humanity. The mission notes that such patterns have become more evident in the period under scrutiny.