IV. Overview of the Factual Situation
Ukraine and the Russian Federation concur in that a large number of Ukrainian children have been, over the past months or years, relocated from their homes either to the Ukrainian regions under the temporary occupation of the Russian Federation or to the territory of the Russian Federation. This fact is therefore well established and uncontested. The two countries however differ in the exact number of such children as well as in the information they provide about the grounds for their relocation, their status during the relocation, their treatment and the possibility of their return to Ukraine.
A. Uncertainty About the Number of Ukrainian Children Subject to Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation
The information about the number of Ukrainian children who have been subject to forcible transfer and/or deportation varies considerably from one source to another. This is to a large extent due to the fact that these sources do not always concentrate on the same category(ies) of children or indeed mix the various categories. The lack of details about how the specific numbers have been reached and the extent to which these have been verified and how, as well as the absence and/or inaccessibility of lists of children included in these numbers also contribute to the uncertainty, as does the generally challenging context of armed conflict which often precludes precise data collection.
The Russian Federation indicated, in an interview to TASS by a representative of an unspecified law enforcement agency, that from February 2022 to February 2023, over 5.3 million persons, including 738,000 children, arrived in the territory of the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine.46 No further details are provided and it is not clear whether the figure only includes children who crossed the internationally recognized borders between Ukraine or Russia or whether it also includes children who moved, or were transferred, to the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine – that the Russian Federation nowadays considers part of its own territory – as well. It is however clear that the figure is not limited to children who were transferred without parents or other legal guardians.
The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Dmytro Mr. Lubinets considers the figure provided by the Russian Federation as exaggerated, suggesting instead that the number of children could amount to some 150,000.47 Mr. Lubinets refers to children “illegally exported” from the territory of Ukraine. In the meeting with the experts, Mr. Lubinets confirmed that this number relates to all children who would have been displaced to the territory of the Russian Federation, in the internationally recognized borders of this country, and not solely to children displaced without parents or other legal guardians. The Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children’s Rights, Ms. Daria Gerasymchuk, estimates that “we may be talking about several hundred thousand kidnapped children, i.e., 200-300 thousands”.48
The National Information Bureau (NIB) of Ukraine for Prisoners of War, Forcibly Deported and Missing Persons, established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in March 2022,49 provides and regularly updates the figure for Ukrainian children who have been “deported” (депортовані).50 This figure shall correspond to “officially verified children on the territory of the Russian Federation”.51 During the visit to Kyiv, the Ukrainian authorities explained to the experts that the verification takes place through repeated checks of the data related to missing children and their whereabouts by several institutions (the NIB, the office of the Prosecutor General, the National Policy, etc.). It is however not completely clear whether the figure includes those children who have been displaced to the Russian Federation with their parents or other legal guardians, or whether it is limited to orphans and unaccompanied children. By 22 April 2023, the number of deported children amounted to 19,393 deported children. The figure provided (at the relevant time) by the NIB has been quoted in the IICIU report,52 in statements by international organizations and by States53 and in the media. The NIB also indicates the number of “returned” children (повернуті) – the figure stood at 361 by 23 April 2023. The Mission was not in a position to verify these figures.
B. Categories of Ukrainian Children Subject to Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation
The Mission has established that within the personal scope of its mandate as indicated above, there are two main categories of children.
The first one encompasses orphans, i.e., children who no longer have parents, either because their parents are dead, or because they are unknown, or because they have legally abandoned the child. Children may become orphans for reasons unrelated to the current conflict or because of the death of their parents in the course of this conflict. Orphans often find themselves, on a temporary or permanent basis, in institutions. They may also be placed, upon the decision of the competent authority, in child custody and guardianship (oпіка та піклування над дітьми),54 in foster families (прийомна сім'я)55 or in foster homes (дитячий будинок сімейного типу).56 If orphans get adopted (усиновлення), they no longer count as orphans, as there is a new legal link established between them and their adoptive parents.57
The second category consists of unaccompanied children, i.e., children who have parent(s) but have been separated from them for various reasons that may be, but do not need to be, related to the current conflict. The category is internally very diverse. It includes children placed, for up to 3, maximum 6 months, under “patronage”58 (патронат над дітьми) in situations where their families struggle with difficult life circumstances, children left by their parents with other family members (for instance when parents work abroad or when a father is recruited into the army and the mother is absent), and children forcibly separated from their parents in the course of the current conflict (for example children whose parents have not passed through filtration or children who have been sent by their parents to the so-called recreation camps but whose returned has been delayed).
According to the data available for 2020, the total size of the child population of Ukraine amounted to 7,579,700 children. Of those, there were 23,000 orphaned children and 47,229 children deprived of parental care. There were 6,000 minors available for adoption.59 The official estimates moreover indicated that by 24 February 2022, there were more than 105,000 children living in Ukraine in some 700 orphanages, boarding schools and other institutions.60 More than a half of the children population of Ukraine has been displaced within Ukraine or across the borders since the start of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation.61 As indicated above, the number of those displaced to the temporarily occupied territories or to the territory of the Russian Federation remains disputed but both the Russian Federation and Ukraine indicate figures amounting to hundreds of thousands of children, including however both children with and without their parents or other legal guardians.
C. Most Commonly Alleged Grounds for the Transfer of Children from Ukraine
The Mission has established that there are three most commonly indicated grounds for the transfer of children from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of temporarily occupied territory or of the Russian Federation. These are the evacuation for security reasons, the transfer for the purpose of adoption or foster care, and the temporary stay in the so-called recreation camps. Quite often, several grounds are put forward at the same time and/or the purpose of the transfer may change over time (e.g., children are sent to the camps but then are not returned back on account of the security situation in their home region). The lawfulness of the alleged grounds for transfer is assessed in the next sections of this report. This section focuses on the factual aspects of the transfer of children justified by the indicated grounds.
1. Evacuation for Security Reasons
The evacuation for security reasons was suggested as the legal ground for the large-scale transfers of civilian population, including children, which took place from the territories of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR, LPR) in the week preceding the Russian Federation´s attack on Ukraine of 24 February 2022. As reported by the Russian sources, one of the very first installations to be fully evacuated from the territory of the so-called DPR to the territory of the Russian Federation (Rostov na Donu) was the Donetsk Boarding School No. 1 hosting some 225 orphans.62 By 20 February 2022, the regional authorities in the Rostov region reported that more than 2,904 children from the territory of the so-called DPR and LPR – most likely both with and without their parents or other legal guardians – had arrived to the Rostov region, amounting to 40% of the total number of evacuated civilian population.63 On the same day, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation reported that around 53,000 evacuees from the so-called DPR and LPR had arrived to Russian territory.64 Were the percentage of children indicated for the Rostov region also applicable here, the total number of Ukrainian children moved to the Russian Federation would reach some 21,000. At the Arria-formula meeting convened by Russia in New York on 4 April 2023, the so-called ombudsman of the so-called DPR, Ms. Daria Morozova, specified that prior to 24 February 2022, in addition to children displaced with their parents, 71 children from children’s homes, more than 760 orphans and children left without parental care and more than 160 pupils of children’s social centres had been evacuated from the territory of the so-called DPR.65
Since the 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation has repeatedly organized transfers of the civilian population, including children, from the Ukrainian territories where active hostilities were taking place or were expected to take place, to Russia.66 The evacuation for security reasons has been provided as the main legal ground for such transfers. Thus, e.g., on 18 June 2022, the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Headquarters of the Russian Federation for Humanitarian Response stated that “over the past 24 hours, without the participation of the Ukrainian side, 29,733 people, including 3,502 children, have been evacuated to the territory of the Russian Federation from dangerous regions of Ukraine and the Donbass republics, and in total since the beginning of the special military operation -1 936,911 people, of which 307,423 are children”.67 From March-May 2022, large-scale transfers of the civilian population, including children, took place from the region of Mariupol,68 followed by more limited transfers from the region from August-November 2022.69
The need to evacuate civilians, including children, for security reasons has also been indicated as the main reason for the transfers taking place upon the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces and occupation administration from certain temporarily occupied territories. For instance, on 8 October 2022, the so-called deputy head of the Russian occupation administration in the temporarily occupied Kherson region, Mr. Kiril Stremousov indicated that the administration had decided to start the evacuation of families with children to the territory of the occupied Crimea and of Russia (Rostov and Krasnodar regions).70 On 21 October 2022, Mr. Stremousov specified that among those transferred to the occupied Crimea were 40 children from an orphanage in Kherson.71 One of the facilities to be evacuated from the Kherson region, in several steps, was the home for disabled children in Oleshki (Олешківський дитячий будинок-інтернат). Some 80 disabled children from this institution were brough to Crimea (Simferopol) and to Russia (Krasnodar).72 Similar transfers have taken place prior to and during the withdrawal of Russian military forces and occupation administration from other Ukrainian regions, such as Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv. One of the most recent examples is the evacuation of children from the town of Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region to the temporarily occupied region of Crimea, which started in mid-April 2023.73
Security reasons are also indicated as the most common ground for the transfer from their home areas of children whose parents have been killed in the current conflict, who have lost their parents in the course of the conflict or whose parents or (legal or other) guardians have been detained during the so-called filtration. Thus, the HRW reports that on 18 March 2022, a volunteer accompanying a group of 17 children aged 2-17 years from a residential healthcare facility in Mariupol was detained at a checkpoint run by the occupation administration of the so-called DPR and separated from the children, whose whereabouts remain uncertain.74
2. Transfer for the Purpose of Adoption or Foster Care
Children have also been transferred from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of adoption or foster care. This is especially the case of children from Crimea, which the Russian Federation has considered to be part of its territory since the unlawful annexation of the region in 2014 and where the Russian legislation on family matters has been applied since.75 This legislation makes it possible for citizens from any part of the Russian Federation to adopt orphaned children from Crimea, since those children are now considered to have Russian citizenship. Already in October 2014, the Russian occupation administration in Crimea joined the initiative called “Trains of Hope” (Поезд надежды). According to the information published by the so-called Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, in the framework of this initiative, “families who came from other regions of the Russian Federation /…/ get acquainted with orphans and children left without parental care, with the aim of further placing them in their families. It is also planned to work on the creation of video profiles for children of this category for posting videos in the media and on a specialized website to draw attention to Crimean children for the possibility of being placed in families of citizens of the Russian Federation”.76 During the meeting with the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Mission received the information suggesting that more than 1,000 children might have been thus displaced from Crimea to various parts of the Russian Federation within the “Trains of Hope” initiative.
After 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation started implementing other means to facilitate adoption of and the provision of foster care for children from the so-called DPR and LPR (then recognized as independent States by the Russian Federation). Since these procedures mainly concerned children who had been evacuated to the territory of the Russian Federation in the context described above, they will be discussed in subsection C (the situation of children during the transfer). It is however important to add here that since the unlawful annexation of the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in October 2022, orphaned children from those regions have been in the same position as orphaned children from Crimea. Perceived to be Russian citizens, they can be adopted by Russian families from any parts of Russia. And indeed, the webportal Усыновите.pу,77 which contains a database of children from various regions of the Russian Federation who are available for adoption (усыновлениe) or foster care (опека – попечительство), also includes data on children from the unlawfully annexed regions of Ukraine.78 The Mission has not come across any figures suggesting how many children from the Ukrainian regions other than Crimea might have been transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation for the purposes of adoption or foster care.
3. Temporary Stays in the So-Called Recreation Camps
There is on the contrary quite a lot of evidence confirming that a large number of Ukrainian children have been transferred to the temporarily occupied territory (Crimea) or to the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of temporary stays in the so-called recreation camps. The Yale Report I indicates that the number of such children might have reached 6,000.79 The same report also suggests that the Ukrainian children have been placed in at least 43 facilities all across the Russian territory, some as far as Siberia and the Eastern Pacific coast.80 Finally, the report notes that various categories of children – children with parents or clear familial guardianship, orphaned children, children in institutions, as well as children those custody is unclear or uncertain due to wartime circumstances – have been transferred to the so-called recreation camps.81 That Ukrainian children have been sent to such camps in Crimea or in the Russian Federation has also been confirmed by Russian sources. These sources also show that the practice of sending Ukrainian children to the so-called recreation camps in Russia started already after the unlawful annexation of Crimea,82 though there are no reports about the reluctance to send them back at those times.
The situation has significantly changed since 24 February 2022, when offers to send children to the so-called recreation camps in Crimea and Russia (and also to Belarus83) have been made to families and facilities from the so-called DPR and LPR as well as from any Ukrainian territories that found themselves, for a shorter or longer period, under the effective control of the Russian Federation. Not only have such offers been often difficult to decline owing both to the harsh living conditions under occupation and the pressure by the Russian or pro-Russian organs. Some of the children have moreover been retained in the camps much longer than originally planned, allegedly due to the security situation in their home region. There are reports of children being moved among various camps, without the consent of (and the information being sent to) their parents or legal guardians.84
In April 2023, the Commissioner for Children Rights under the President of the RF, Ms. Lvova-Belova informed in her Telegram posts that “since October 2022, more than 2.5 thousand children have returned to their families from holiday camps, despite the difficulties that have arisen”.85 She also noted that these were children from the Kherson, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions whom their parents “sent voluntarily at the end of the summer – in the fall of 2022, including to take them out from under shelling. After a while, they were separated by the front line - and it became difficult to pick up the children. Fathers of draft age were not released by the authorities of Ukraine, mothers could not always go on the road, because there was no one to leave other children with or they were too small, someone moved. Not everyone was able to find a trusted person who could come for the child”.86 According to Ms. Lvova-Belova, all children from the three regions had returned home by mid-April 2023.87 The Mission was not in a position to verify this information or to obtain more specific figures about the Ukrainian children (from the three regions or from other parts of Ukraine, including those unlawfully annexed by Russia) who were sent to the so-called recreation camps and have still not been returned to their families. A certain variation to the temporary stay in the so-called recreation camps is the transfer of Ukrainian children to the temporarily occupied territories or to the Russian Federation allegedly for medical or rehabilitation purposes. For instance, it was reported that on 6 October 2022, children from three schools in Kherson (schools No. 30, 41 and 52) were transferred by the Russian occupying authorities to Crimea for “rehabilitation”.88
D. Status of the Ukrainian Children During the Forcible Transfer or Deportation
The information received from witnesses and collected by expert bodies and by NGOs suggests that during forcible transfer or deportation, Ukrainian children are either placed in certain institutions (children’s homes, the so-called recreation camps, etc.) or in Russian families (foster families or adoptive families). There is no exact data available as to the number or the proportion of children subject to these different types of placements. The Mission received reports indicating that Ukrainian children were often repeatedly moved from one place to another and from one form of placement to another, during their stay in Russia.89
The Family Code of the Russian Federation90 distinguishes three forms of family placement of children deprived of parental care (формы семейного устройства детей, оставшихся без попечения родителей). These are adoption (усыновление, удочерение), foster family (приёмная семья) and custody and guardianship (опека и попечительство).91 Children may also be placed under supervision in educational organizations, medical organizations or organizations providing social services.92 All these forms may be used “in cases of death of parents, deprivation of their parental rights, restriction of their parental rights, recognition of parents as incapacitated, illness of parents, prolonged absence of parents, and evasion of parents from raising children or from protecting their rights and interests /…/”.93 In addition, around 30 regions of the Russian Federation have introduced legislation on “patronage”,94 which is a temporary form of placement of children in need of special State care.
The adoption is considered “a priority form of placement of children left without parental care”.95 It is carried out based on a judicial decision and it may entail the change of the name, surname and the date and place of birth of the child. It is guided by the principle of secrecy, due to which there is not, and there cannot be, any database of adopted children.96 Unlike some of the other forms of family placement, adoption is not remunerated but some regions provide a one-off allowance paid from local budgets to adoptive families, the amount of which can reach up to 300,000 roubles.97 Similarly to these other forms, adoption regulated by the Russian Family Code only concerns children with the Russian citizenship.
The process of legalizing the placement of Ukrainian children in Russian families involved several key legislative changes:
- On 9 March 2022, President Putin called for a change in legislation to allow for the placement of orphaned children from the DPR and LPR in Russian families, even without Russian citizenship, noting “these are extraordinary circumstances...”.98 This was followed by legislative work and negotiations.99
- On 20 May 2022, Presidential Decree No. 330 was issued, extending a simplified procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship to “orphans and children left without parental care... who are citizens of the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic or Ukraine, temporarily staying, permanently or temporarily residing on the territory of the Russian Federation”.105 This decree allowed guardians or heads of institutions to apply for citizenship on the children’s behalf.
- Following the unlawful annexation of four Ukrainian regions in October 2022, a later decree (No. 951) and the Federal Law of March 18, 2023, further simplified the procedure for relinquishing Ukrainian citizenship for children under 14 years old based on an application by their parents or legal guardians, including representatives of institutions, without the child's influence.107108
The change of citizenship makes orphaned and unaccompanied children available for adoption or other forms of family placement. The Mission noted reports of great interest among Russian families to take in Ukrainian children109 and that families reportedly had to undergo special (patriotic) courses and received financial incentives.110 Ms. Lvova-Belova announced on 26 October 2022 that almost 350 orphaned children from Donbas had been placed in foster families (приемные семьи) in 16 regions.111 While some sources refer to these placements as formal adoption (усыновление)112 and Ms. Lvova-Belova herself stated she had adopted a 15-year-old boy from Mariupol,113 she later claimed that the term 'adoption' (усыновление) was incorrect and that children were placed under custody and guardianship (опека и попечительство) or in foster families (приёмная семья).114 Due to the secrecy of adoption, verification is difficult, but the Mission finds it plausible that non-judicial forms of placement are favoured.
The Mission received information suggesting that Ukrainian children are exposed to pro-Russian information campaigns and targeted re-education during their stay, which includes attending Russian schools under Russian curricula and being required to manifest pro-Russian feelings, such as singing the Russian Federation's anthem.115116
E. Return of Ukrainian Children
According to the Ukrainian NIB, only 361 out of the total number of 19,393 “deported” children were “returned” to Ukraine by 23 April 2023. The details of these returns are not publicly available, but they appear to be the result of a “joint operation” involving Ukrainian authorities (the NIB, the Office of the Prosecutor General, secret services, etc.), civil society organizations from Ukraine and/or other countries, volunteers from Ukraine and/or Russia as well as, and mainly, parents, other relatives, or other legal guardians of the relevant children.
Reports by NGOs and statements by victims and witnesses consistently confirm that the Russian Federation is not actively seeking relatives of Ukrainian children who have been transferred to the temporarily occupied territories or to the territory of the Russian Federation or indeed providing any assistance to those parents or other relatives and/or legal guardians who are seeking to reunite with their children. Rather coversely, Russia seems to make it difficult for Ukrainian families, as well as Ukrainian authorities, to locate the transferred Ukrainian children by inter alia not having any lists of such children, repeatedly moving children from one place to another or using the Russian form of names for Ukrainian.117
- ↑ За год с Украины и из Донбасса на территорию РФ прибыло 5,3 млн беженцев, ТАСС, 20 февраля 2023.
- ↑ Кількість незаконно вивезених у росію українських дітей може сягати 150 тисяч, Укрінформ, 17. 2. 2023
- ↑ У Офісі Президента заявили, що у росії створили понад 70 таборів для "перевиховання" депортованих дітей з України, Рубрика, 23 квітня 2023.
- ↑ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Disposal No. 228-R, On the definition of a state-owned enterprise that performs the functions of the National Information Bureau, 17 March 2022 (Кабінет Міністрів України, Розпорядження від 17 березня 2022 р. № 228-р, Про визначення державного підприємства, яке виконує функції Національного інформаційного бюро).
- ↑ Deported, Children of War, available at: https://childrenofwar.gov.ua/en/ By the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on “Some issues of protection of persons, including children, deported or forcibly displaced in connection with the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine”, adopted on 18 April 2023, the database run by the NIB should become the only official database of deported persons and it should contain information both on adult persons and on children.
- ↑ Ibidem.
- ↑ IICIU Report, op. cit., para 95.
- ↑ We are strongest when we act together, European Parliament (President), 23 March 2023; Von der Leyen pledges to help return Ukrainian children, EU Observer, 24 March 2023.
- ↑ See Section 19 of the Family Code of Ukraine.
- ↑ See Section 201 of the Family Code of Ukraine.
- ↑ See Section 202 the Family Code of Ukraine.
- ↑ See Section 18 of the Family Code of Ukraine.
- ↑ See Section 20 of the Family Code of Ukraine.
- ↑ Data from the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, see the OHCHR Report II, op. cit., para 51.
- ↑ OHCHR Report II, op. cit., para 52.
- ↑ See, for instance, a statement by the UNICEF Executive Director, Catherine Russell, in UN Security Council, 7 March 2022.
- ↑ Эвакуацию из ДНР начали с детей-сирот из школы-интерната в Донецке, Интерфакс, 18 февраля 2022.
- ↑ В Ростовской области подсчитали количество прибывших из Донбасса детей, Lenta.ru, 20 февраля 2022.
- ↑ Названо число эвакуированных в Россию жителей Донбасса, Lenta.ru, 20 февраля 2022.
- ↑ Омбудсмен считает, что РФ приняла исчерпывающие меры для безопасности эвакуированных детей, Tass.ru, 5 апреля 2023.
- ↑ Human Rights Watch, “We Must Provide a Family, Not Rebuild Orphanages” The Consequences of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine for Children in Ukrainian Residential Institutions, 13 March 2023, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/03/13/we-must-provide-family-not-rebuild-orphanages/consequences-russias-invasion (HRW Report I).
- ↑ Заявление Межведомственного координационного штаба Российской Федерации по гуманитарному реагированию, 18 июня 2022, available at: https://telegra.ph/Zayavlenie-Mezhvedomstvennogo-koordinacionnogo-shtaba-Rossijskoj-Federacii-po-gumanitarnomu-reagirovaniyu-ot-18-iyunya-2022-g-06-18
- ↑ Из Мариуполя за сутки эвакуировали 408 человек, РИА Новости, 9 мая 2022.
- ↑ Ольга Ульянова, З Харківщини на територію РФ незаконно вивезли 179 дітей, Суспільне, 28 грудня 2022.
- ↑ В Херсонской области решили начать эвакуацию детей с родителями, Красная Весна, 8 октября 2022.
- ↑ Детей-сирот из Дома малютки в Херсоне эвакуировали в Крым - власти, , Интерфакс, 21 октября 2022.
- ↑ Andriy Ermak, Telegram Post, 23 October 2022, available at: https://t.me/ermaka2022/1512; and a submission by the International Partnership for Human Rights, on file with the authors. By 23 April 2023, most of these children had been either picked up by their parents or transferred back to the Kherson region (to Skadovsk).
- ↑ Occupiers carry out forced "evacuation" of children from Enerhodar, Mind, 16 April 2023.
- ↑ Human Rights Watch, “We Had No Choice” “Filtration” and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia, 1 September 2022, p. 73, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forcibly-transferring-ukrainian-civilians (HRW Report II).
- ↑ See Закон Республики Крым от 1 сентября 2014 г. № 62-ЗРК "Об организации деятельности органов опеки и попечительства в Республике Крым".
- ↑ Крым присоединился к всероссийской акции «Поезд надежды», Министерство образования, науки и молодежи Республики Крым, 16 октября 2014.
- ↑ Available at: https://usynovite.ru/
- ↑ At the time of the submission of this report, only children from Crimea could effectively be found through the database available on the website; the search for children from other Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia) has not rendered any results.
- ↑ Yale School of Public Health, Russia’s systematic program for the re-education & adoption of Ukraine’s children, 14 February 2023, available at: https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/items/ 97f919ccfe524d31a241b53ca44076b8/data (Yale Report I), p. 4.
- ↑ Ibidem, p. 5.
- ↑ Ibidem, p. 4.
- ↑ Для участия в оборонно-спортивном лагере «Гвардеец» в Нижний Новгород приехали подростки из Крыма, Официальный сайт полномочного представителя Президента Российской Федерации в Приволжском федеральном округе, 29 мая 2015, available at: http://pfo.gov.ru/press/events/87972/
- ↑ Как украинские дети отдыхают в лагерях Беларуси, Cоюз Россия-Беларусь, 17 августа 2022.
- ↑ See A submission to the Moscow Mechanism on the issue of forcible deportation of children in Ukraine, The Reckoning Project (TRP), April 2023 (on file with the authors).
- ↑ Maria Lvova-Belova, Telegram Post, 14 April 2023, available at: https://t.me/malvovabelova/1321
- ↑ Maria Lvova-Belova, Telegram Post, 4 April 2023, available at: https://t.me/malvovabelova/1282
- ↑ Maria Lvova-Belova, Telegram Post, 14 April 2023, available at: https://t.me/malvovabelova/1321
- ↑ Окупаційна влада Херсонщини вивозить дітей з тимчасово окупованої території області, Суспільне, 11 жовтня 2022.
- ↑ A submission, The Reckoning Project (TRP), op. cit.; a submission by the International Partnership for Human Rights, on file with authors.
- ↑ Семейный кодекс Российской Федерации от 29 декабря 1995 г. № 223-ФЗ.
- ↑ See Sections 19-21 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation. See also Федеральный закон от 24 апреля 2008 г. № 48-ФЗ "Об опеке и попечительстве".
- ↑ See Section 22 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation.
- ↑ Article 121(1) of the Family Code of the Russian Federation.
- ↑ See, for instance, Закон г. Москвы от 14 апреля 2010 г. № 12 "Об организации опеки, попечительства и патронажа в городе Москве", cтатья 12 (Патронатное воспитание).
- ↑ Article 124(1) of the Family Code of the Russian Federation.
- ↑ See also Постановление Правительства РФ от 29 марта 2000 г. № 275 “Правила передачи детей на усыновление (удочерение) и осуществления контроля за условиями их жизни и воспитания в семьях усыновителей на территории Российской Федерации”.
- ↑ See, for instance, Закон Краснодарского края от 29 декабря 2008 г. № 1662-КЗ “О единовременном денежном пособии гражданам, усыновившим (удочерившим) ребенка (детей) в Краснодарском крае”.
- ↑ Путин призвал разрешить размещать сирот из Донбасса в российские семьи, Известия, 9 марта 2022.
- ↑ Maria Lvova-Belova, Telegram Post, 11 March 2022, available at: https://t.me/malvovabelova/14.
- ↑ «Задача экстраординарная»: в РФ готовят поправки для усыновления детей из Донбасса, Известия, 5 мая 2022.
- ↑ Федеральный закон от 31 мая 2002 г. № 62-ФЗ "О гражданстве Российской Федерации".
- ↑ Указ Президента РФ от 24 апреля 2019 г. № 183 "Об определении в гуманитарных целях категорий лиц, имеющих право обратиться с заявлениями о приеме в гражданство Российской Федерации в упрощенном порядке".
- ↑ Указ Президента РФ от 29 апреля 2019 г. № 187 "Об отдельных категориях иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства, имеющих право обратиться с заявлениями о приеме в гражданство Российской Федерации в упрощенном порядке"
- ↑ Указ Президента РФ № 183, op. cit., para 1.
- ↑ Указ Президента РФ от 30 мая 2022 г. № 330 "О внесении изменений в Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 24 апреля 2019 г. № 183 "Об определении в гуманитарных целях категорий лиц, имеющих право обратиться с заявлениями о приеме в гражданство Российской Федерации в упрощенном порядке" и Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 29 апреля 2019 г. № 187 "Об отдельных категориях иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства, имеющих право обратиться с заявлениями о приеме в гражданство Российской Федерации в упрощенном порядке".
- ↑ Telegram, 5. 7. 2022, available at: https://t.me/malvovabelova/331
- ↑ Указ Президента Российской Федерации от от 26 декабря 2022 г. № 951 "О некоторых вопросах приобретения гражданства Российской Федерации".
- ↑ Федеральный закон от 18 марта 2023 г. № 62-ФЗ "Об особенностях правового положения граждан Российской Федерации, имеющих гражданство Украины".
- ↑ В России 1200 семей готовы принять детей-сирот из Донбасса, РИА Новости, 14 мая 2022.
- ↑ Семьям, принявшим детей с Донбасса, окажут материальную помощь, Волга Ньюс, 12 октября 2022
- ↑ Семьи России приняли почти 350 сирот из Донбасса, заявила Львова-Белова, РИА Новости, 26 октября 2022.
- ↑ Human Rights Watch, “We Must Provide a Family, Not Rebuild Orphanages” The Consequences of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine for Children in Ukrainian Residential Institutions, 13 March 2023, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/03/13/we-must-provide-family-not-rebuild-orphanages/consequences-russias-invasion (HRW Report I).
- ↑ В детский дом с личным визитом. Львова-Белова представила приёмного сына, Аргументы и Факты, 28 сентября 2022.
- ↑ Maria Lvova-Belova, Telegram Post, 4 April 2023, available at: https://t.me/malvovabelova/1282
- ↑ See A submission to the Moscow Mechanism on the issue of forcible deportation of children in Ukraine, The Reckoning Project (TRP), April 2023 (on file with the authors).
- ↑ See, for instance, a submission by the International Partnership for Human Rights, on file with the authors.


